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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 over three hundred Canadian cases were reported in which
issues of evidence were raised, and often as many as five or six issues of
evidence were dealt with in one case. Consequently, because of this sur-
prising number, this survey only covers those cases reported in 1974 that
fall within the areas mentioned in the outline above. These areas seemed
to be the ones of most topical interest. The leading cases in other areas of
evidence will be discussed in a subsequent survey.
No new trends in evidence law or the approach to evidence law are
discernible from the cases reported during the year. This is unfortunate,
indeed depressing. The habit of judges at least since the turn of the century
has been to determine the admissibility of evidence by pigeon-holing offered
proof into one of a number of arbitrary categories. The ordinary usage of
the term describing each category determines its scope. No thought is
given to the purpose of the category or to the objectives of the rules of evi-
dence. The conditions that precipitate the invocation of a particular cate-
gory are determined most frequently by referring to one of the editions,
often not the most current, of that much maligned English textbook, Phipson
on Evidence. Indeed, Phipson's statements of the law, or the statements of
his editors, (no one bothers to distinguish between them), are treated as
legislative fiats. In one of the most perceptive but unfortunately neglected
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articles on evidence law, Dean Wright accurately described the evolution of
most present day evidentiary doctrine:
[B]ooks like Phipson disclose that the past hitsory of this part of the law
has been to treat evidence in the same manner as the law of real property
-to categorize and classify rigidly and to develop those categories some-
times, one would be temp.ed to say, merely for the sake of mediaeval
logic. If common sense, used in this field to denote what a reasonable
man would consider as something normally of probative value, rebelled
against too rigid categories, there was always the normal legal method of
making a new category in which one could classify anew what he could not
force into another mold. I
Wigmore, in the preface to the first edition of his treatise on evidence,
quoted a then recent President of the American Bar Association who criticiz-
ed the unthinking reliance on precedent in even stronger language:
A judge may decide almost any question any way, and still be supported
by an array of cases. Cases are our counters, and there are no coins. Our
legal arguments are for the most part a mere casino-like matching and un-
matching of cases, involving little or no intellectual effort. The law is
ceasing to be a question of principles, and is becoming a mere question
of patterns. I
The cases reported this year confirm that this ostrich-like approach to
evidence law is still rampant. To paraphrase a well-known aphorism: "The
rules of evidence are beneficent. They prevent men from thinking."
II. COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
The word competency has not over the past two hundred years acquired
a precise legal usage. In general it refers to the characteristics of a person
that may disqualify him from giving testimony at a judicial trial. For
clarity, the concept may be subdivided into those characteristics of a witness
that render his testimony of such slight probative value that it is not worth
the court's time to listen to it, and those characteristics of a witness which
for other policy reasons make it undesirable that he should give testimony
in a particular trial. The term perceptive incompetencies is sometimes used
to refer to the former characteristics; policy incompetencies to refer to the
latter.
A. Perceptive Incompetencies
1. Mental Incapacity
A witness may by reason of mental deficiency lack capacity to perceive,
'Wright, The Law of Evidence: Present and Future, 20 CAN. BAR. REv. 714, at
716 (1942).
2 Preface to I J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE at XV (3d ed. 1940) [herein-
after cited as WIGMORE].
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recollect or narrate effectively, or to testify truthfully. Older authorities
would suggest that witnesses, if their competency was objected to, must
demonstrate that they possess some undefined but apparently real level of
ability with respect to each of these testimonial elements. But Wigmore
concluded: "The tendency of modem times is to abandon all attempts to
distinguish between incapacity which affects only the degree of credibility
and incapacity which excludes the witness entirely. The whole question is
one of degree only, and the attempt to measure degrees and to define that
point at which total incredibility ceases and credibility begins is an attempt
to discover the intangible." ' In view of this trend, challenges to a witness's
perceptive competency are rare. However, in Regina v. HMvke,' apparently
such an objection was made. The key prosecution witness was a suspected
eye-witness to a killing which formed the basis of a charge of murder; in-
deed, initially she had been jointly charged with the accused. She had a
history of mental illness. It is not clear from Mr. Justice Haines's reasons
for judgment what the precise objection to her testimony was. He states:
"Counsel for the defence objected to her as being incompetent to take an
oath." Under section 14 of the Canada Evidence Act,' somewhat sur-
prisingly, a witness can be objected to as incompetent to take an oath. The
objection appears to be a vestige of the common law rule that a witness was
assumed to have the capability of testifying truthfully only if he believed
that divine punishment would follow false swearing. However, since a
witness who is incompetent to take an oath can still give evidence by making
an affirmation, it is difficult to understand why counsel would ever press the
objection, except perhaps to gain what might be a tactical advantage of
having a witness, who is testifying against the accused, do so before the trier
of fact without the imprimatur of giving testimony under oath. Mr. Justice
Haines did rule that the witness could not take the oath, and she gave her
testimony after making an affirmation, so this must have been one of coun-
sers objections to her testimony. But, as well, he probably objected that
she was incompetent to testify even after making an affirmation because her
mental deficiencies affected her capacity to perceive and recall events ac-
curately. As mentioned above, Mr. Justice Haines ruled that she was
competent to testify. Her mental condition would be relevant in assessing
her credibility. In support of Mr. Justice Haines's ruling on this aspect of
the case and because this matter may arise again, it seems appropriate to
quote from McCormick:
Disqualification for mental capacity or immaturity would doubtless have
long since been abandoned, except for the presence of the jury as the trier
of facts. The judges distrust a jury's ability to assay the words of a small
child or of a deranged person. Conceding the jury's deficiencies, the
remedy of excluding such a witness, who may be the only person available
' i WIGMOaE § 501, at 594.
4 3 Ont.2d 210, 16 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 438 (High CL 1974).
5 Id. at 214, 16 Can. Crim. Cas.2d at 442.
6 CAN. REv. STAT. c. E-10 (1970).
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who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Though the tribunal is
unskilled, and the testimony difficult to weigh, it is still better to let the
evidence come in for what it is worth, with cautionary instructions. As
already indicated mental derangement, where it affects the ability of the
witness to observe, remember, and recount, may always be proved to attack
credibility. 7
2. Religious Belief
The influence of the religious qualification of witnesses is also reflected
in the statutory rules relating to the testimony of children. Section 16 of
the Canada Evidence Act provides that a child of tender years may give
evidence if he is "possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception
of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth". However
the testimony of such a child must be corroborated unless the judge finds
that the child "understand[s] the nature of an oath". ' Thus much of the
testing of a child's ability to testify turns on the requirement that he under-
stands the nature of an oath. The questions traditionally put to a child in
order to determine this question have bordered on the ludicrous. ' At one
time it was held that the answers to the questions must reveal that the child
understands both the nature and the consequences of the oath. However,
perhaps embarrassed by the metaphysics and futility of an inquiry about the
"posthumous theological consequences of lying" 10 and aware that "[tihe
common law deserves better than that at the hands of the judiciary in the
20th century. . .", " recent cases have held that if the child understands the
nature of the oath that will suffice to qualify him. " Once this was settled,
the question that naturally arose was: what is the difference in the apparently
important distinction the section makes between a child who "understand[s]
the nature of an oath" and a child who only "understands the duty of speak-
ing the truth" and whose testimony must therefore be corroborated? In
Regina v. Dinsmore, "3 in reasons for judgment in which he exhaustively re-
viewed the English and Canadian cases, Mr. Justice McDonald concluded
that the following questions qualified a child to take the oath: "Q. How old
are you...? A. I'm 12. Q. Do you know what it means to take an oath?
A. Yes, to swear to tell the truth. Q. What happens if you don't tell the
truth? A. You can be punished. Q. By whom? A. The law." 1 Mr.
7 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 140-41 (2d cd. 1972)
(footnotes omitted).
SCAN. REV. STAT. c. E-10 (1970).
'See examples in Bigelow, Witnesses of Tender Years, 9 CriM. L.Q. 298 (1966-
67). 6 Regina v. Dinsmore, [1974] 5 W.W.R. 121, at 123 (Alta. Sup. Ct.) (Mc-
Donald, J.).
"1 Regina v. Horsburgh, [1966] 1 Ont. 739, at 755, 47 Can. Crim. 151, at 166-67
(1965) (Laskin, J.A.).
2 The leading case is Regina v. Bannerman, 55 W.W.R. 257, 48 Can. Crim. 110
(Man. 1966).
"
3 Supra note 10.
14 d. at 122.
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Justice McDonald stated that he was prepared "to hold that the child may
be sworn if the inquiry reveals that he understands the temporal conse-
quences of not telling the truth when under oath". " Mr. Justice McDonald
has, it seems, equated the two requirements, and while purporting to follow
the previous Canadian cases, notably Regina v. Bannerman, " he has obli-
terated a distinction drawn in those cases. When the section says that to
give any testimony the child must "understand the duty of speaking the
truth", the section would appear to be referring to a secular responsibility.
A child could reveal this understanding by stating the secular consequences
of telling a lie. When the section requires that the child "understand the
nature of an oath" before being sworn, the section could perhaps be inter-
preted to mean that the child must undertsand his moral obligation to tell
the truth. In Bannerman, unlike Dinsmore, the child, admittedly by simply
assenting to a leading question, nevertheless agreed that it was "bad" to tell
a lie. This additional question might be necessary to reveal that the child
understands his moral obligation to tell the truth, and hence the nature of
the oath. Mr. Justice McDonald said:
The judge must be satisfied that the child understands the nature of an
oath in that he understands the moral obligation to tell the truth. If, as
in Bannerman, the judge may be so satisfied if the child acknowledges that
it is "bad" and "wrong" not to tell the truth, then it is surely sufficient if
the child, using his own and not the judge's words, says that he knows that
taking an oath means "to swear to tell the truth" and that if he does not
tell the truth "You can be punished ... (by) the law.""7
Although one could quarrel philosophically with his assertion that there is no
difference between understanding "the nature of an oath" and "a duty to
speak the truth", hopefully McDonald's judgment will be accepted, and
judges will not waste any more of their time debating this question. The
moral development of a child does not reveal itself to the clumsy kind of
ritual that lawyers or judges employ in attempting to qualify a child, nor
is it likely that lawyers or judges are capable of making that judgment without
expert assistance even after more prolonged questioning.
B. Policy Incompetencies
Reasons unrelated to the probative value of offered evidence frequently
account for its exclusion. Whether a rule which excludes evidence for such
reasons is called a privilege or a rule of competency is perhaps unimportant.
At least the clarity in thinking that would result from mutually exclusive and
functional definitions of rules of privilege and of rules of competency, if it
were possible, would probably be outweighed by the confusion it would
create in the minds of those familiar with past usages. Therefore conven-
tional usages will be used here. One functional distinction between rules
Is Id. at 130.
16 Supra note 12.
'
T Supra note 10, at 130 (emphasis added).
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of policy incompetencies and privileges that might be made is that generally
rules of incompetency are designed to protect essential process values,
whereas rules of privilege are designed to protect other social values. But
the incompetency of spouses is an obvious illustration in which current
Canadian and English usage does not conform to such a functional definition.
1. Jurors
At common law, a juror was incompetent to give testimony that would
impeach the verdict of a jury of which he was a member. However, Lord
Mansfield, who formulated this rule, left open the possibility that a third
person who saw or overheard a jury engaging in improper conduct during
their deliberations, could be called to give testimony that would impeach
the jury's verdict. " In 1974, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that
in Canada even this ubiquitous other person is incompetent to give testimony
to impeach a jury's verdict." Thus a juror's verdict is now indeed as "in-
scrutable as a billiard ball". The court reasoned that if- a third person could
give testimony tending to impeach the jury's verdict, a juror might have to
be called to give rebuttal testimony. However, that is precluded by section
576.2 of the Criminal Code"0 which makes it an offence for a juror to dis-
close any information relating to the proceedings of the jury.-
Jurors must be protected from undue harrassment; and. their verdicts
must obtain some measure of finality. On the other hand, if a person is
convicted as a result of the flip of a coin, because of threats made upon a
juror, or because the jurors agreed that a majority- vote would decide the
fate of the accused so that they could return home--as apparently happened
in the Saskatchewan case-the accused by any standard -has been denied
procedural due process. Surely some balance could be struck between these
competing interests, and might be required by the Bill of Right&_ Many
American courts and recent codifications in the United-States, have provided
that while a juror may not testify about the effect of anything-upon his mind
as influencing his verdict, he is competent to give evidence of any misconduct
or irregularity occurring outside the jury room that might have influenced
the verdict. There is a legion of American cases and. articles dealing with
the problem. "
18Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). Three jurymen
submitted affidavits alleging that their verdict was based- on chance. Lord Mansfield
held: "The court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jurymen-themselves;
in all of whom such conduct is a very high misdemeanor: but- in every case the Court
must derive their knowledge from some other source: such as from some persort
having seen the transaction through a window, or by some such other means."
19Regina v. Perras (No. 2), [1974] 5 W.W.R. 187, 18 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 47
(Sask.).
20 Can. Stat. 1972 c. 13, § 49.
2"Se Palmer, Post-Trial Interview of Jurors In The Federal Courts-A Lawyer's
Dilemma, 6 HOUSTON L. Ray. 290 (1968); Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts,
25 U. CHI. L. REv. 360 (1957-58).
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2. Lawyers
Many reasons can be advanced for holding that a lawyer who is acting
as counsel in a case should be incompetent to testify as a witness in the
same case: the embarrassment of a lawyer arguing the credibility of his own
testimony before the trier of fact; the unseemliness of a lawyer contradicting
on the witness stand a witness whom he had previously attempted to im-
peach on cross-examination; the unfairness of putting opposing counsel in
the position of perhaps having to challenge his credibility; and the unfairness
of saddling a client with an obviously partisan witness. On the other hand,
the necessity for a lawyer to take the stand on behalf of his client may not
arise until the litigation has begun; and in a rare case, not only might the
testimony of a lawyer be essential to protect the interests of his client, but this
need may have arisen at a time when the lawyer's withdrawal from the case
would work a substantial hardship on his client and might prejudice his
case. Therefore, although the cases are impossible to reconcile, the better
view would appear to be that while counsel is not necessarily incompetent
to appear as a witness on his client's behalf, such a practice should be
strongly discouraged, and if counsel deems it essential to testify, the trial
judge has a discretion to ask him to withdraw from the case, a discretion
which he should exercise after weighing the considerations mentioned above.
In Phoenix v. Metcalfe," the British Columbia Court of Appeal went
even further, and suggested that while as a matter of propriety counsel should
generally not give evidence, the trial judge cannot require him, in any cir-
cumstances, to elect either to give evidence or to continue as counsel. The
counsel for the plaintiff in the case had called his law partner to the stand
and during his examination it became apparent that the defendant's counsel
would probably have to give evidence for the defendant at the trial. At this
point in the trial, the trial judge ruled that both parties should retain dif-
ferent counsel. The defendant did retain another counsel, and therefore
the Court of Appeal's ruling on counsel testifying is obiter. Since the de-
fendant did not appear on the appeal, the Court of Appeal invited the views
of the Benchers of the Law Society on the matter. The court simply adopt-
ed the opinion submitted by the Benchers that a trial judge cannot require a
counsel to elect either to give evidence or to continue as counsel. However,
in a case reported in 1974, the Supreme Court of Canada, without citation
of authority, suggested that the trial judge does have the right to require
counsel to withdraw if he appears as a witness. In Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Roland Roy Fourrures Inc., " counsel for the plaintiff took the stand to
explain that the discrepancy between the plaintiffs evidence on discovery
and at the trial was due to a misunderstanding of a question on discovery
that his client had informed him of immediately after the discovery. It ap-
pears from the Supreme Court's reasons for judgment that the trial judge
in finding against the plaintiff ignored this testimony given by his counsel.
-[1974] 5 W.W.R. 661 (B.C.).
23 [1974] Sup. Ct. 52, 35 D.L.R.3d 591 (1973).
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The Supreme Court held that the trial judge should have taken the testimony
into consideration in reaching his decision, but Mr. Justice Pigeon went on
to say: "Counsel for the appellant was correct in saying that counsel in ques-
tion ought to have refrained from taking any part in the trial . . . . Nor
should the judge have tolerated such participation." 24
The issue that was directly before the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in Phoenix v. Metcalfe ' was whether a law partner of counsel is a competent
witness; or, to put it another way, whether a counsel can continue in a case
if his law partner becomes a witness. The court not only held that a law
partner of counsel is a competent witness, but also said "there is nothing
reprehensible or improper in a solicitor giving evidence on behalf of his client
even though the solicitor be a partner of the client's counsel". 20 Although
the court's holding seems sensible, the court's suggestion that it is not im-
proper for counsel to call a law partner to the stand without withdrawing
from the case is contrary to the Code of Professional Ethics adopted by the
Canadian Bar Association just last year. Rule 3 in Chapter VIII of the
Code provides:
The lawyer should not submit his own affidavit to or testify before a tri-
bunal in any proceedings in which he appears as advocate, save as permitted
by local rules of practice or as to purely formal or uncontroverted matter.
This also applies to the lawyer's partners and associates: generally speaking
they should not testify in such proceedings except as merely formal mat-
ters .... 27
It is unfortunate that neither the British Columbia Court of Appeal nor
the Canadian Bar Association felt the need to discuss the considerations
that led to their respective conclusions. Although counsel's partner is likely
to be a biased witness in the sense that he has an interest, monetary and
otherwise, in the outcome of the case, most of the dangers that are present
when counsel himself takes the stand are not present when his partner takes
the stand. Since the giving of evidence by counsel appears to be a matter
of increasing concern, this situation will undoubtedly arise again in the near
future, particularly in a situation where a counsel who must become a witness
wishes to turn the case over to a partner. 2"
One of the inevitable consequences when cases are decided on the basis
of factual differences in prior cases, rather than by the application of policy
enunciated in or discernable from prior cases, is that distinctions arise in the
cases that are difficult to support on principle. Thus, while many cases
have held that counsel may give evidence as a witness at trial, " the cases
are almost unanimous in holding that counsel cannot submit his own affidavit
24 Id. at 56, 35 D.L.R.3d at 594.
25 Supra note 22.
26 Id. at 663.27 CANADLuN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs (1974).
28 For a discussion of the American position, see Sutton, The Testilying Advo-
cate, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 477, at 492 (1963).
2" See cases cited in Phoenix v. Metcalfe, supra note 22.
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in support of a motion. This line of cases was followed in Baydon Corp.
v. du Pont Glore Forgan Canada Ltd. 3 Mr. Justice Henry in that case
held that an affidavit submitted by counsel in support of a motion to amend
the pleadings in the case was inadmissible even though both sides consented
to the introduction of the affidavit. He reasoned that the affidavit should
be inadmissible since the court might wish to cross-examine the deponent and
"to subject a deponent to such searching inquiry while he is at the same time
fulfilling the role of counsel is not in keeping with the respect that should
be accorded counsel who is actually conducting the case as an officer of
the Court". "
Related to the competency of counsel to appear as a witness is the
question of whether counsel who does appear as a witness can argue the case
on appeal. In Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Grabarchuk, ' the Ontario Court of
Appeal reaffirmed "a well-settled rule which the Court has strictly enforced
over the years", ' that counsel who appears as a witness at trial cannot ap-
pear as counsel on the appeal. While it is difficult to see that any great
dangers arise when a witness at trial appears as counsel on appeal, presum-
ably it is felt that any embarrassment that might be caused can be avoided
by the slight cost of instructing a different counsel on appeal. The case is
otherwise interesting because the appeal was from an order dismissing an
application to have a default judgment set aside in which both counsel filed
affidavits. While the headnote of the case in the Ontario Reports reads
that it "is improper for the deponent of an affidavit to act as counsel and
rely upon the affidavit", ' the Court of Appeal in their reasons for judg-
ment made no mention of such impropriety.
3. Spouses
Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act ' dealing with the competence
and compellability of spouses has not often been the subject of judicial in-
terpretation. It appears that in spite of the thirty-three exceptions to the
general rule that spouses are not competent to give evidence against each
other, the prosecution seldom calls them. In Regina v. Lonsdale, " the
accused was charged with attempted murder. After the incident giving
rise to the charge, but before the trial, the accused on the advice of counsel
married the victim. The wife, when called by the prosecution at the trial,
stated that she did not wish to testify, and the judge sustained her request.
Two questions thus arose on appeal: (1) whether spouses who are married
at the time of trial are incompetent to give testimony against one another
even though their marriage took place after the commission of the alleged
04 Ont2d 290 (High Ct. 1974).
SI d. at 299.
3 Ont.2d 783 (1974).
3Id. at 784.
34 1d. at 783.
SCAN. REv. STAT. C. E-10 (1970).
3124 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 225 (Alta. 1973).
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offence; and (2) whether a spouse who is competent at common law to give
evidence against his or her spouse is also compellable. Relying on prior
decisions, the Court of Appeal answered both questions affirmatively.
The present law with respect to the competence and compellability of
spouses is so arbitrary that it is difficult to rationalize any decision in this
area by reference to the policy of the common law or the legislature. How-
ever, the court might have begun such a rationalization. The common law
rule that one spouse cannot testify against the other rests on the assumption
that the exclusion of such testimony is necessary to preserve the harmony
of the marital relationship, and on the judgment that the preservation of the
marriage in question is more important than the introduction of relevant
evidence. "' Where one spouse is accused of having committed a direct of-
fence against the other, the common law so-called "necessity exception"
provides that the spouse alleged to be the victim is competent to testify
against the accused spouse. Whether the exception also renders the victim
spouse compellable to testify against the other depends logically upon the
justification for the exception. If the exception was designed to protect a
weak and malleable wife against her husband, then perhaps it makes sense
to require compellability. A wife who needs such protection would be easily
intimidated into not testifying voluntarily. Another theory of the exception
might be that it was necessary to vindicate the state's interest in the prosecu-
tion of crimes. The victim spouse will often be the only available witness to
an offence committed by one spouse against the other. Again, if this
rationale were accepted, the compellability of the spouse could be justified.
On the other hand, a more likely purpose of the exception to the privilege
was simply to provide a wife with the means of protecting herself against
her husband. All that is necessary to fulfill this purpose is that the injured
spouse have the option to testify. Compelling her to testify cannot be justi-
fied. This approach would also be more consistent with the purpose of the
privilege itself. If a wife refuses to testify against her husband, that is strong
evidence that there is a marital relationship worth protecting (unless it is
assumed that a wife is under the total sway of her husband).
The rule that spouses need not testify against each other is arbitrary in
its application. The court does not inquire into the circumstances of a
particular marriage to see if in fact it is a viable relationship worth protecting.
Therefore, it seems consistent to hold that even if the parties married after
the commission of the offence the court will apply the privilege. However,
in Regina v. Lonsdale, the court might have inquired into whether or not the
marriage itself was a sham. If the marriage was a sham, entered into with-
out any intention of living together as man and wife, the policy of the privi-
lege obviously does not apply, and the court might have been justified in
disregarding the legal status of the parties.
'" VIII WIGMORE § 2228, at 213-22.
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III. QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES
A. Role of the Judge
In an adversary proceeding, the primary responsibility for calling and
questioning witnesses must rest upon the parties. If the judge limits his
role in the conduct of the proceedings, it is assumed that his ultimate decision
will be more acceptable to the parties, that the parties will be more motivated
to diligently seek out and present all relevant evidence, and that the judge
will reach a more accurate decision because it will not be biased by his partici-
pation. On the other hand, it has long been recognized that unrestrained
adversary proceedings might be self-defeating. Therefore the judge has an
affirmative responsibility to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly
and expeditiously. The judge's primary role in the trial is thus defined by
a delicate balancing of these interests.
The judge's right to call a witness not called by the parties, to question
witnesses, to order the accused to testify before other witnesses called by
him, and to control the questioning of witnesses, are four areas in which the
question of the judge's role in the presentation of evidence arose this year.
1. Judge's Right to Call Witnesses
It is settled law that the trial judge has the right in criminal cases to
call a witness not called by the parties. There are, however, several limita-
tions upon this right, one of them being that the judge should not call a
witness after the defence has closed his case unless the need to call such a
witness arose unexpectedly. Judge 6 Hearn of the County Court of Halifax,
Nova Scotia found that such a situation arose in Regina v. Bouchard " and
consequently called three additional witnesses after the close of the defence's
case. The accused had called a psychiatrist to support his defence of auto-
matism to the charges of impaired driving and refusing to supply a breath
sample. The psychiatrist based his opinion that the accused was in a state
of automatism following the accident which led to the charge in part upon
what others had told him about the accused's behaviour at the time, and in
part upon an oral report given to him by a doctor who had examined the
accused after the accident. At the close of the case, Judge 6 Hearn was
troubled about the accuracy of some of the matters upon which the psy-
chiatrist had based his opinion of automatism. Therefore, since they had
not been called by defence counsel, he called the doctor who had examined
the accused after the accident and upon whose opinion of the accused's
condition the psychiatrist had relied, and two additional eye-witnesses to the
accused's behaviour following the accident. Judge 6 Hearn felt that the
necessity to call these witnesses arose ex improviso because he might have
led defence counsel to believe from his ruling on the admissibility of the
psychiatrist's evidence that it was not necessary to call these further witnesses.
312 Can. Crirn. Cas.2d 554, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 31 (N.S. Cry. Ct. 1973).
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The author of an annotation following the report of Regina v. Bouchard
in the Criminal Reports was critical of Judge 6 Hearn's handling of the
case. 39 Judge (6 Hearn, the author alleged, should have invited defence
counsel to call the witnesses rather than calling them himself. This criticism
seems to result from a concern for the form of the adversary system rather
than its substance. If at the end of a case the judge is in doubt about some
specific matter in the case and thinks that a witness not called by the parties
could shed light on the matter, calling the witness himself, and then permitting
each counsel to examine the witness on the matter, as Judge 6 Hearn did,
would in most cases be the most expeditious manner of proceeding. Indeed
it is difficult to see the justification for the rigorous requirement that a matter
must have arisen ex improviso before the judge can call a witness after the
close of the case for the defence. The question that the judge should be
concerned about if he calls his own witness at the close of the case is whether
both parties can be given a fair opportunity to reply to any new evidence
elicited.
2. Judge's Right to Question Witnesses
It is of course primarily the function of counsel to question the wit-
nesses called at trial. However, the trial judge has a responsiblity to ques-
tion witnesses if such a course is necessary to clarify testimony, or to elicit
relevant evidence because counsel's examination has been ineffective. "'
The extent of his questioning is limited by the fact that excessive questioning
by him will endanger the interests that the adversary system is designed to
enhance. For instance, the adversary system permits the judge to maintain
an appearance of impartiality throughout the trial. If he questions witnes-
ses excessively, the danger arises that he will appear partial to one side.
This danger arose in Johnson v. Nova Scotia Trust Co. 4 where a trial judge
asked a witness eighty-two questions, and at times allegedly argued with her.
Although the Nova Scotia Appeal Court stated that a trial judge should not
question a witness in a manner which might upset her, or which might be
taken to be an attack on her credibility, in the particular case the trial
judge's intervention was not reversible error.
This same danger that results from the trial judge's excessive ques-
tioning, that the judge's appearance of impartiality will be endangered, was
also stressed in an Ontario case. ' In their reasons for judgment, the
Ontario Court of Appeal also reviewed other dangers that the trial judge
must guard against when questioning witnesses: the danger that the jury
will be unduly influenced by the manner in which the judge questions a wit-
ness, either by giving the witness's testimony undue emphasis, or by as-
39 Stenning, "One Blind Man to See Fair Play": The Judge's Right to Call Wit-
nesses, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 49 (1974).4 0 Cf. R. v. Torbiak, 18 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 229, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 108 (Ont.
1974) (Kelly, J.A.).
41 6 N.S.2d 88, 43 D.L.R.3d 222 (1973).
42Regina v. Torbiak, supra note 40.
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sessing the witness's credibility by the manner in which the judge questioned
him, and the danger that his questioning will disrupt an effective and pre-
conceived line of questioning being pursued by counsel and thus prevent
him from adequately presenting his case. In the present case, however, the
Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's questioning was not excessive.
They found that the trial judge asked his question in a fair and impartial
manner. Unless it was simply a question requiring clarification of the
witness's testimony, the judge did not intervene until both counsel had com-
pleted their questioning of the witness.
3. Judge's Right to Vary the Order of Calling Witnesses
The order in which witnesses are called is again a matter for counsel
to decide. The adversary system assumes that both sides will present their
strongest case; part of their strategy in doing so will invariably embrace the
order in which they call their witnesses. The judge will in most cases be
indifferent about the order in which witnesses are called since most wit-
nesses will be excluded from the courtroom and thus each witness will give
the same testimony irrespective of when he is called. However, the parties
to a lawsuit are not excluded from the courtroom, and thus if counsel
chooses not to call the party he is acting for as his first witness, the question
might arise as to whether the judge has the right to compel the party to
testify first so that he cannot tailor his evidence to conform to the testimony
that he hears witnesses called by him give. In civil cases, under the rules
of practice of most provinces, the trial judge is expressly given this author-
ity. " A judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal handed down in 1972,
but not reported until 1974, held that the trial judge had this right at com-
mon law and therefore could compel the accused, if he chose to testify, to
testify before other witnesses called by him." Although no authorities are
cited in the case, the holding is similar to a holding of the English Court of
Appeal (Criminal Division), ' but contrary to a holding of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, ' and a holding of the United States Supreme
Court " where that court held that requiring the accused to testify first was
a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and an infringement of
his right of due process. The court clearly has an interest in obtaining
testimony that can be easily evaluated and an interest in minimizing perjury.
Requiring the accused to give his testimony before other witnesses called
by him eases the evaluative task of the trier of fact by ensuring that the
"See, e.g., ONT. R.P. r. 253(b).
"Regina v. Archer, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 225 (Ont. 1972). But see Campbell,
The Order of Defence Witnesses, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 227 (1974), where the author
suggests that the case might be narrowly construed to apply only to cases with similar
facts; namely, where the accused has raised the defence of alibi and his counsel has
stated in his opening address to the jury that the accused will be called as a witness.
"R. v. Smith, [1968] 2 All E.R. 115, 52 Cr. App. R. 224 (C.C.A.).
"Regina v. Smuk, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 613, 15 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 218 (B.C.).
"
7Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 32 L.Ed.2d 358, 92 S. Ct. 1891 (1972).
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accused is not tailoring his testimony to that given by the other witnesses
called by him. However, as mentioned earlier, one of the assumptions of
the adversary system is that the truth is most likely to emerge if both sides
present their most persuasive case. The order in which evidence is pre-
sented is clearly a factor that determines the persuasive force of proof.
Thus requiring the accused to testify first will, in some cases, weaken the
persuasive force of the defence's case. Furthermore, the accused may decide
to exercise his right to silence if other witnesses called by him are effective
in presenting his defence. If he is required to choose at the outset of his
case whether he will take the stand or not, he might feel compelled to take
the stand in cases where if he could have assessed the evidence of other
witnesses called by him first he might have remained silent. Where the
balance is struck between these competing interests will of course depend
upon the court's view of the importance of the various values at stake.
Since the question is an important one and since Regina v. Archer is un-
doubtedly a case that is being followed in Ontario, it is unfortunate that the
Court of Appeal did not more carefully appraise the issue before them (the
judgment was delivered orally).
4. Judge's Right to Control Cross-Examination
The trial judge has at common law a broad discretion to control the
conduct of cross-examination to ensure that the trial is conducted expedi-
tiously and without the undue harrassment of the witnesses. In Regina v.
Bradbury, "' the trial judge was held to have abused a discretion that he had
exercised on both of these grounds. ' The trial judge, after a long and ex-
hausting cross-examination of an investigating officer, informed counsel that
he had to complete his cross-examination within a prescribed period of time.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that this was an abuse of the trial judge's
discretion. They said that although the trial judge has "[t]he right and
indeed the responsibility . . to control the proceedings before him to pre-
vent conduct which may well be or become an abuse of the process of the
court . . .", "0 he can only exercise his discretion to disallow vexatious and
time-consuming questions after each question is asked. He cannot rule in
advance that any further questioning was vexatious. Although it would
undoubtedly be a rare case, one could conceive of a situation where counsel's
questioning had become so repetitious, time-consuming, vexatious and un-
fruitious that in the interests of expedition and in protecting the integrity
of the witness the trial judge should be able to rule that it come to an end.
In such a situation, Bradbury should be confined to its facts.
The trial judge in Bradbury also ruled that the credibility of an inipor-
tant crown witness could not be impeached by questions relating to a police
4' 14 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 139, 23 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 293 (Oat. 1973).
4' However, on the facts of the case, the abuse was held not to have caused a
substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.
50Supra note 48, at 140, 23 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 294.
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record that the witness had incurred when he was a juvenile. The Court
of Appeal held that this also was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion to
control the conduct of cross-examination. They stated: "We . . . are of
the opinion that when questions are directed to a witness concerning his
antecedents, associations or mode of life which would be likely to discredit
his testimony or degrade his character or to show the untruth of statements
he has made in the same proceedings, he enjoys no higher protection because
of his status as a juvenile than is to be accorded to any witness in a like
situation who is not a juvenile." " Thus, presumably the court was not
denying that the trial judge has a right to prohibit generally questions that
might embarrass the witness and are of little probative value. They were
simply holding that in this case the questions were of probative value-the
witness in his examination-in-chief had testified that he was unfamiliar with
the police--and that the fact that the witness was a juvenile when he en-
gaged in the alleged misconduct should not enter into the weighing of the
competing interests. In deference to the general policy of the law to treat
juvenile adjudications and juvenile delinquents under the theory parens
patriae, the court might have been more sensitive to the admission of the
misconduct of a person when a juvenile. Again, the case might be restricted
to its facts, namely a situation where the witness in examination-in-chief
denies that he has had any contact with the police.
B. Direct Examination
1. Leading Questions
If counsel calls a witness favorable to the party he is representing, there
is a danger that the witness might acquiesce in suggestions made to him by
counsel. Therefore, as a general rule, leading questions are prohibited on
direct examination. Although the rule is not always strictly enforced, coun-
sel who elicits testimony on direct examination by asking leading questions
runs the risk that such testimony may not be given much weight. Thus, in
an action for misrepresentation, in finding that the plaintiff did not rely on
the representations made by the defendant, Mr. Justice McFarlane, of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, noted that relevant testimony given by the
plaintiff during examination-in-chief was elicited by leading questions, "
presumably therefore giving the evidence less weight than it would otherwise
have received.
2. Refreshing Memory
At least one recent Canadian case has held that if a witness refreshes
his memory from a document out-of-court, that document must be produced
51 Id. at 142, 23 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 295-96.
52 Contini v. Canarim Inv. Corp., [1974] 5 W.W.R. 709, at 715, 49 D.LR.3d 262,
at 268 (B.C.).
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at trial at the request of cross-examining counsel. 33 Defence counsel, in a
case reported in 1974, argued that the court should go even further and
prohibit witnesses from refreshing their memory from any document, in this
case the witness's testimony at the preliminary hearing, outside the court-
room. " Judge Graburn held that a witness could refresh his memory out
of court by reading over his "zestimony given at the preliminary hearing, but
that if the witness also read the testimony of other witnesses given at the
preliminary hearing "it would be grounds for judicial censure and seriously
affect the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility". " The case is
only interesting because the argument is so novel. Because the trial often
takes place so long after the relevant events in dispute, and because our
memory of events diminishes drastically over time, unless the trial is to turn
into a test of memory, one would have thought that a counsel would be
negligent in the discharge of his responsibilities if he did not invite witnesses
to re-read before trial their previous testimony. Indeed it is common prac-
tice for witnesses to re-read before trial statements they may have given a
lawyer or investigator following an accident or whatever, even though such
statements were not made immediately after the event and therefore could
not be used by the witness to refresh his memory on the witness stand.
Until dispositions for trial are taken immediately after the event, such a
course seems necessary and wise. Indeed it points up both the futility and
the incongruity of not permitting witnesses to refresh their memory from
such documents while on the witness stand.
C. Cross-Examination
1. Right to Cross-Examine Co-Accused
A party can normally cross-examine a witness called by another party,
but the question of whether a party can cross-examine a witness called by a
co-party has remained unsettled. In Regina v. McLaughlin, "' the Ontario
Court of Appeal settled the question in criminal cases by holding that an
accused has an absolute right to cross-examine a co-accused who testifies
on his own behalf. While the case has the support of recent English au-
thority,"' in principle an absolute right to cross-examination would appear
to go too far. Where the interests of the co-accused are antagonistic, ob-
viously one accused should be able to impeach the other and ask him lead-
ing questions in eliciting his testimony. But where there is an identity of
interests between the co-accuseds, and the acquittal of one must carry the
same result for the other, or where they are clearly favorably disposed to-
wards one another, there would appear to be little justification for permitting
53 Regina v. Lepine, 39 W.W.R. (n.s.) 253, 38 Can. Crim. 145 (Sask. Dist. Ct.
1962).
-4 Regina v. Husbands, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 188 (Ont. Cty. Ct. 1973).51 d. at 193.
"2 Ont.2d 514, 15 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 562 (1974).
'7 R. v. Hilton, [1971] 3 All E.R. 541, [1971] 3 W.L.R. 625 (C.A.).
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one to cross-examine the other. Leading questions are prohibited because
of the danger that if a witness is sympathetic to the party questioning him
and desires to give only such answers as he believes will help the party, the
witness may be susceptible to acquiescing in suggestions made by that party
through his questions. If this danger is present, the judge, in principle,
should be able to preclude an accused from cross-examining a co-accused.
2. Limits of Cross-Examination
Counsel on cross-examination may make insinuations about a witness's
motives and character with such presence that even though the witness
denies them the trier of fact will be led to believe they are true. Obviously
such tactics can be gravely unfair to the witness. Since it is difficult for the
trial judge to control such questioning, counsel must bear the responsibility,
in discharge of his duty to the court, to balance the interest in seeking in-
formation from the witness against the interest in protecting the witness from
unfair insinuations. In Regina v. Bencardino, " crown counsel in cross-
examining a witness stated: "I put it to you, Paolo, that Bruno Pisani told
you that you had to change your evidence on that one material point .... "'
The witness denied the allegation, and the prosecutor called no evidence to
support it. Mr. Justice Jessup held that there was no illegality involved in
putting the question. He quoted Lord Radcliffe:
An advocate is entitled to use his discretion as to whether to put questions
in the course of cross-examination which are based on material which he
is not in a position to prove directly. The penalty is that, if he gets a
denial or some answer that does not suit him, the answer stands against
him for what it is worth. 6
The allegation made by crown counsel in Bencardino was a logical in-
ference from the circumstantial evidence in the case. However if such was
not the case, it would undoubtedly be improper for counsel to suggest that a
witness had acted fraudently or dishonestly unless he had reasonable grounds
for believing that his insinuations were true."
3. Effect of Failure to Cross-Examine
A point that is often ignored is that if counsel fails to cross-examine a
witness he may severely prejudice his client's case. If he fails to cross-
examine a witness on a matter, he cannot later contradict the witness on that
point." Some courts have gone even further and held that if counsel does
not cross-examine a witness, the trier of fact must accept the testimony of
2 Ont.2d 351, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 173 (1973).
"Id. at 355, 24 Can. Crim. (us.) at 177.
6*Id. at 356, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 179, quotation is from Fox v. General
Medical Council, [1960] 1 W.IR. 1017, at 1023 (P.C.).
"' W. BOULTON, CoNDucT AND ETIQUErTm AT THu BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES
75-76 (4th ed. 1965).
Regina v. Dyck, 70 W.W.R. 449, [1970] 2 Can. Crim. Cas. 283, 8 Can. Crim.
(n.s.) 191 (B.C. 1969).
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that witness. 0 Gagne v. Day & Ross Ltd. " illustrates this danger of not
cross-examining. The trial judge believed the testimony of the plaintiff in
a motor-vehicle accident case and found the defendant 100 per cent at
fault. The Court of Appeal reversed and found the plaintiff 100 per cent
at fault. Mr. Justice Ryan noted in his judgment: "Had counsel for the
plaintiff wished to challenge the testimony of [the defendant] he should have
cross-examined him which he did not do."" While it is uncertain whether
the court held in the case that if a witness is not cross-examined his testimony
must be accepted by the trier of fact, it is clear from the case that the lawyer
severely prejudiced his client's case by not cross-examining.
Another case reported in 1974 illustrates the importance not only of
cross-examining, but of cross-examining effectively. In Gavrilovic v. The
Queen," Mr. Justice Branco of the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated
that a "careful perusal of [the accused's] cross-examination shows that the
appellant held firm to his narrative-in-chief and was quite unshaken. In
such circumstances his evidence is entitled to some credibility". 0 The
court held that because the accused was not broken down in any way in
cross-examination, the explanation he gave in his defence to a charge of
shoplifting should have been sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. There-
fore the accused's conviction was set aside and a verdict of acquittal entered.
The rule that counsel should cross-examine a witness on a matter that
he regards as contentious embodies a basic requirement of fairness to the
witness. If a witness who is going to be contradicted on a fact is given
notice of such contradiction, he may be able to explain the contradiction or
reword his testimony if it appears that he was misunderstood. To permit a
witness to be discredited by another witness when in fact there was only a
misunderstanding is obviously unfair. However, to apply a rule designed
to alleviate this unfairness so as to require the trier of fact to accept the
testimony of a witness who was not cross-examined goes too far. While such
a preliminary foundation is desirable in principle, the consequences of a
failure to undertake it should depend upon the facts of each case and an
assessment of the seriousness in the case of the dangers that the rule was
designed to minimize. In recent years the courts unfortunately appear
willing to impart the rigidities that accompany the foundational requirement
for prior inconsistent statements to all testimony given by a witness.
D. Exclusion of Witnesses
To enhance the probative value of testimonial proof, witnesses not
testifying may be excluded from the courtroom to ensure that they are not
influenced consciously or unconsciously by hearing what other witnesses say
63See the cases cited in J. SoPiNKA & S. LEDERMAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
CivIL CASES 515-16 (1974).
8 N.B.2d 60 (1974).
"Id. at 65.
cc [1974] 5 W.W.R. 262, 18 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 287 (B.C.).
67Id. at 268, 18 Can. Crim. Cas.2d at 293.
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on the stand. " While it appears settled that the exclusion of witnesses is
not a right of the parties, but is a matter within the trial judge's discretion,
it is still not clear what the sanction is for a refusal to obey an order for ex-
clusion, other than, of course, a citation for contempt. Wigmore was of the
view that the majority of courts had properly held that the trial judge could
disqualify a witness who had breached the order from giving evidence. ,
However, in spite of suggestions to the contrary, " modem Canadian and
English authority are almost unanimous in holding that the trial judge can-
not exclude the testimony of a witness who has remained in the courtroom
contrary to an order for exclusion. '
Although it would appear that he cannot prevent a witness who has
not obeyed an order for exclusion from testifying, recent cases seem to hold
that the trial judge should direct the jury, or instruct himself, to consider
the fact that a witness has remained in the courtroom when assessing the
weight to be given to the testimony of such a witness. In Regina v. Dobber-
thein, ' the Alberta Court of Appeal held that if the trial judge expressly
instructs himself on this point with respect to one witness, it will be assumed
that he considered the matter in assessing the weight to be given to the testi-
mony of another witness in the same case who also remained in the court-
room after an order excluding witnesses had been given. Insisting on the
ritual, Mr. Justice Sinclair, dissenting, argued that it was reversible error for
a trial judge not to expressly instruct himself about this matter when con-
sidering the testimony of each such witness. The Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal would appear to be less strict in requiring judicial comment about the
presence of a witness in the courtroom. In Regina v. Wilson " that court
held that in a jury trial it was not essential that the trial judge comment in
his instructions to the jury on the presence of a witness in the courtroom
during the trial, particularly since the judge had remarked on the presence
of the witness in the courtroom at the closing of the cross-examination of
the witness. Hopefully the courts will follow the lead of the Nova Scotia
Appeal Court and not erect another rigid requirement as to what must be
included in the trial judge's instruction to the jury.
In principle, the order of exclusion should continue to apply to witnesses
who have been called to give evidence since they might be called again in
"8 For a general discussion of the probative purposes of the exclusion of witnesses,
see Sinclair, J.A., (dissenting) in Regina v. Dobberthien, (1973] 6 W.W.R. 539, 24
Can. Crim. (n.s.) 245 (Alta.).
" VI WiOMoRa § 1842, at 365.
"See Allen, J.A. in Regina v. Dobberthien, supra note 68, at 541-42, 24 Can.
Crim. (n.s.) at 247-48.
"I Regina v. Warren, 6 N.S.2d 323, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 349 (1973); Regina
v. Wilson, 6 N.S.2d 395, 25 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 47 (1973); see cases cited by Sinclair,
J.A. (dissenting) in Regina v. Dobberthien, supra note 68. In some provinces the
rules of practice purport to give the trial judge the authority to exclude the testimony
of a person who does not comply with an order for exclusion: e.g., OrT. R.P. r. 253.
. Supra note 68.
" Supra note 71.
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rebuttal. Although in practice an order for exclusion is not strictly applied
to such witnesses since it may be very improbable that they will be recalled,
Dobberthien " held that the same rules do apply.
As well as the parties, and the investigating officer, 15 expert witnesses
are frequently exempted from the order for the exclusion of witnesses.
However unless the expert must base his opinion on the testimony of wit-
nesses given at trial, it is not an error for the trial judge to exclude the ex-
pert from the courtroom until he testifies. ,'
IV. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
A. Impeaching One's Own Witness
Generally a party cannot impeach the credibility of his own witness.
One of the absurd consequences of this common law rule was revealed in
a case reported this year, Regina v. St. Pierre. "' So that the trier of fact
would not conclude that he was trying to hide something from them, the ac-
cused wished, in his examination-in-chief, to diiclose that he had a prior
criminal record. The trial judge apparently ruled that this evidence could
not be elicited as being relevant to his credibility because it would run afoul
of the rule that a party cannot impeach the credibility of a witness called
by him. Therefore, if it was elicited, it would only be admissible as cir-
cumstantial evidence of his guilt. The accused thus decided not to lead
the evidence since if the Crown questioned him about his record on cross-
examination the jury would be instructed that they could only use the evi-
dence in assessing his credibility, and could not use it to infer that he was
the kind of person who might commit the crime with which he was charged.
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge, holding that it was the
practice in Ontario "on the basis of its fairness" " to permit the accused to
be examined about his prior record on direct examination. If the accused
did not bring out his record on direct examination, "[tihe jury may have
concluded that his failure to do so was in itself a reflection on his credi-
bility". " The court further held that where the accused revealed on direct
examination that he had a prior record, he was not putting his character in
issue. Therefore, the jury should be instructed that they could use that
evidence only in assessing the accused's credibility as a witness. This case is
another illustration of the court reaching a right result but being unable to
rationalize it in terms of established evidentiary doctrine. Rather than in-
quiring into the validity of the rule or rationalizing their decision in terms
"
4 Supra note 68.
75 Cf. Regina v. Wilson, supra note 71 (Coffin, J.A.).76 Regina v. Warren, supra note 71, at 343, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 367.
73 Ont.2d 642, 17 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 489 (Ont. 1974), applied li Regina v.
Macdonald, 20 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 144, 27 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 212 (Ont. 1974).
78 Regina v. St. Pierre, supra note 77, at 653, 17 Can. Crim. Cas.2d at 499.7 1Id., 17 Can. Crim. Cas.2d at 500.
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of its policy, they simply ignored it. Indeed it would have been hard to
rationalize in terms of present rules since if the accused argued that he was
not attacking his own credibility, but simply rendering the Crown's attack
less effective he would run afoul of another rule-generally the credibility
of a witness cannot be supported until it has been attacked.
B. Prior Inconsistent Statements
An exception to the general rule that a party cannot impeach the
credibility of a witness called by him is provided for in section 9 of the
Canada Evidence Act. " Pursuant to that section, a party calling a witness
may impeach his credibility "if the witness, in the opinion of the court,
proves adverse" by proving that the witness made at other times a statement
inconsistent with his present testimony. In determining whether the witness
is adverse and whether the prior statements are inconsistent, the judge will
normally examine the prior statements. In Regina v. Sinclair," the issue
arose as to whether the opposing counsel as well could examine the state-
ments on an application under section 9. Mr. Justice Wilson of the Mani-
toba Queen's Bench held that he could. Such an examination seems essen-
tial if counsel is to intelligently oppose the application. Since the matter
arose at a preliminary hearing, the presiding provincial judge had apparently
felt that the accused could not compel production of statements in possession
of the Crown. He was apparently confusing the production of statements
under section 10 of the Evidence Act, which the Supreme Court has held
does not apply to preliminary hearings, with the foundational requirements
of section 9.
A fairly elaborate body of jurisprudence is building up around the use of
prior inconsistent statements to impeach a witness's credibility. It is surpris-
ing that there appears to be so much difficulty with what should be a common
sense procedure. This year the Quebec Court of Appeal on appeal from a
trial that had lasted five weeks, felt compelled to order a new trial because
the trial judge had insisted that before defence counsel could cross-examine
the Crown's witness about prior statements he had made, counsel had to
satisfy the judge that the statements were inconsistent with the witness's
present testimony. ' Section 10 of the Canada Evidence Act clearly pro-
vides that "a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made
by him in writing, or reduced to writing.. .." " The only relevant question
is, do the prior statements impugn the witness's testimony. They may do so
even though not inconsistent as that word is ordinarily used. The trial
judge was apparently confusing section 10 with section 9 of the Canada
Evidence Act. Section 9 provides that if a witness called by a party proves
goCAN. REV. STAT. c. E-10 (1970).81 [1974] 6 W.W.R. 719, 19 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 123 (Man. Q.B.).
8Cormier v. The Queen, 25 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 94 (Que. 1973).
'
3 CAN. REv. STAT. C. E-10 (1970).
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adverse, the party "may prove that the witness made at other times a state-
ment inconsistent with his present testimony ... .""
In two cases reported this year, the courts reiterated the common law
rule that unless the witness admits on the stand that a prior inconsistent
statement made by him is true, the statement is only admissible for the pur-
pose of impeaching the credibility of the witness and not as evidence of the
matters asserted in it. In both cases, the prior statement was an important
part of the prosecution's case. In Regina v. Moir, ' the statement was
made by the passenger of an automobile identifying the accused as the
driver. At trial, the witness admitted making the statement but denied it
was true. In Regina v. Jackson, " the statement was made by the victim
of an assault identifying the accused as his assailant. At trial, the witness
denied making the statement. In both cases, the Court of Appeal reversed
the convictions on the grounds of insufficient evidence. One of the argu-
ments often made for admitting prior statements as substantive evidence is
that earlier statements made by a witness are usually more trustworthy. In
both of these cases, one has the feeling upon reading the reasons for judg-
ment that indeed the earlier statements were more reliable. It is unfortunate
that a rigid application of the hearsay rule prevents the trier of fact from
giving such evidence whatever weight it rationally deserves.
C. Collateral Fact Rule
Every trial lawyer knows that a witness cannot be contradicted on a
collateral matter, yet few can explain precisely when a matter is collateral.
The common way of stating the rule is to say that a witness cannot be con-
tradicted on a matter that is not relevant to the issues being tried, and then
to list a number of exceptions; namely, if the matter relates to the witness's
(1) character trait for untruthfulness, (2) prior inconsistent statement, (3)
previous conviction, (4) bias, interest or corruption, "' (5) perceptual abili-
ties, and (6) opportunity to observe. Indeed the definition of the rule is
so elusive and the exceptions so numerous that the courts would probably
save a great deal of time and senseless bickering if they were to simply apply
the rationale of the rule rather than attempt to apply a definition of the rule
or one of its countless exceptions. Thus the rule could be restated: "A
witness cannot be contradicted on a matter unless the probative value of the
contradictory evidence outweighs the probability that its admission will
necessitate the undue consumption of time or create substantial danger of
confusing the issues. Ordinarily, if the contradictory evidence is not rele-
vant to a fact in issue or to the witness's credibility except to the extent that
84 Id.
15 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 305 (Ont. High Ct. 1974).
86 6 N.S.2d 434 (1973).
87 Regina v. Bencardino, supra note 58, at 358, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 181 (the
fact that a witness was intimidated into changing his testimony could be proved by
extrinsic evidence).
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it shows that he might be mistaken about the matter, it should be excluded."
McCormick describes a fact that a witness might be contradicted upon even
though it has no probative value independent of the contradiction, as a fact
about "the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which
as a matter of human experience he would not be mistaken about if his story
were true". " Indeed, the courts have perhaps unwittingly reached this
point. There appears to be a recognized exception to the collateral fact
rule that the contradictory proof is admissible if the probative value of the
contradiction outweighs the danger of the undue consumption of time and
the confusion of issues. " The exception would appear to be destructive
of the rule. Yet the courts cling to the rule, defining it, refining it, creating
exceptions to it, and sometimes ignoring it.
A case from British Columbia, Regina v. Porter, " illustrates the kind
of trap the courts can get into while attempting to determine the limits of the
rule about collateral facts by reference to prior cases. The accused upon
being stopped by the police and questioned about a stolen motorcycle gave
a false name, David Peterson. At trial he testified, upon cross-examination,
that he had never used the name Dave Peterson before. The Crown wished
to call rebuttal evidence to show that the accused had used the same alias
on a previous involvement with the police at Calgary. Defence counsel
objected to the evidence on the grounds that the Crown was attempting to
contradict the witness on a collateral issue. The trial judge reviewed three
recent cases dealing with collateral facts and concluded on the basis of the
facts and decision of each case that whether a fact is collateral depends upon
who raised it. If a matter is raised by a witness in his examination-in-chief,
it can always be contradicted. If it is raised on cross-examination, it cannot
be contradicted. The case is a perfect example, and there are many in the
cases on evidentiary matters, of a court formulating a rule from factual dis-
tinctions of prior cases without any reference whatsoever to the purpose of the
rule. If the purpose of the collateral fact rule is to protect the court from
the needless confusion of issues and the unjustifiable consumption of time,
it is obvious that the factual distinction made by the trial judge is irrelevant.
The judge undoubtedly derived the distinction from some remarks that were
made in Regina v. Gross. " Mr. Justice MacKay stated inthat case: "Evi-
dence-in-chief, to be admissible, must be relevant to the issues being tried
and reply evidence may be called in respect of any matters that counsel in
examination-in-chief elect to introduce." n' But in fact often in direct ex-
amination counsel elicits, or the witness volunteers, background facts that
are irrelevant to the issues in the case. In Gross, the fact introduced was
that the accused was a successful businessman and thus unlikely to have
91 C. McComIcr, supra note 7, at 99.
8See cases cited in S. SCHFF, EVIDENCE IN TIE LIrIGATION Pnocass: A COURSE-
BOOK IN LAw 590 (draft ed. 1974).
90 16 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 422 (B.C. Prov. Ct. 1974).
919 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 122 (Ont. 1972).
9 Id. at 124.
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engaged in the offences charged, the making of counterfeit money. This
fact relating to the witness's motive or lack of it for committing the crime,
is clearly probative, and its contradiction would thus be equally probative.
The fact it was elicited in direct examination is unrelated to its probative
value. If on cross-examination questions were asked about the accused's
financial condition and he replied that he was a successful businessman,
surely the contradiction of that fact would be just as probative as would its
contradiction if it was elicited on direct examination. The argument might
be that the collateral fact rule should not apply to matters raised on direct
examination since a witness cannot contend that he would be unfairly
surprised if the matter were contradicted. However, that is probably not
true, and furthermore unfair surprise, at least in most modern jurisprudence,
is not accepted as a reason for the collateral fact rule. "
In Regina v. Darwin, " the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that
the fact that a witness had engaged in a criminal course of conduct involving
drugs was collateral and therefore inadmissible. While the decision is cor-
rect in law, the court appealed to the wrong rule to justify it. A person's
character trait for truthfulness as tending to prove his credibility is not
collateral, or if it is collateral there has always been an exception to the
collateral fact rule permitting its proof. However, a rule even older than
the collateral fact rule, and based on slightly different policy grounds, for-
bids the proof of character by specific instances of past conduct. A witness
can be discredited by reputation evidence or in some circumstances opinion
evidence which tends to prove he is the kind of person who should not be
believed under oath, but specific instances of his past conduct are inad-
missible for this purpose. The exclusion of such specific instances has
nothing to do with the collateral fact rule.
D. Supporting Credibility: Recent Complaints
Normally, a witness's prior statements consistent with his testimony are
inadmissible. Such statements are excluded because in most instances they
are irrelevant. The fact that a witness has repeated out of court the testi-
mony he gives at trial generally does not increase the probative value of
that testimony. And whatever probative value it might have is outweighed
by the time that would be wasted if evidence was lead proving and dis-
proving consistent out of court statements. However, in some situations
prior consistent statements do have probative value, and therefore the law
has recognized a number of exceptions to this general rule. One of those
exceptions, the subject of a number of reported cases in 1974, is recent
complaints.
The doctrine of the admissibility of recent complaints generates as
many appeals as any other evidentiary rule. This seemingly innocuous rule
93III A WiaMoRE § 1007, at 979-81.
'413 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 432 (B.C. 1973).
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is based on a sound premise of human behavior-a person who has been
the victim of a crime is likely to complain about it on the first reasonable
opportunity. If he fails to so complain, one natural inference from such
failure is that a crime was not committed. Thus a recent complaint, by re-
butting this inference, has probative value and should be admitted into
evidence even though it is a prior statement consistent with the witness's
testimony at trial. Unfortunately most of the jurisprudence about the doc-
trine has arisen out of recent complaints in rape and other sexual cases in
which women are the victims, suggesting perhaps that if men are the victims
of crimes of violence no adverse inference should be drawn against them
if they fail to immediately complain since men are generally credible about
such matters. The rationale of the admissibility of recent complaints clearly
would extend to all crimes in which the victim could be expected, as a matter
of ordinary human behavior, to immediately complain about the incident.
In order to be probative, the complaint must have been made at the
first reasonable opportunity. Since the issue is whether the victim in the
particular case could have been expected to complain earlier if his allega-
tions were true, the test of whether the complaint was made at the first
reasonable opportunity should obviously be a subjective one. This test, as
opposed to an objective test, is now generally accepted by the courts. '
The courts have also held that only the first complaint made by a victim
is admissible. " Normally a second or even tenth complaint will be of little
probative value. However, more than one complaint will be admissible if
the complaints form "a reasonable sequence of steps in a single continuous
complaint". In Regina v. Volk, " the victim complained of a sexual as-
sault to two men who picked her up on the highway and at her request
drove her to the police station, and then upon arrival at the police station
to the police. The trial judge excluded the evidence of the complaint to
the police since it was not the first complaint. The Alberta Court of Ap-
peal, however, held that the second complaint was part of "a reasonable
sequence of steps in a single continuous complaint"" and therefore should
have been admitted. It is puzzling why the courts have such a great need
to conceptualize and pigeon-hole evidence. On the question of whether
the second complaint should be admissible, surely the question is quite
simply: "Does it have any probative value?" The need to analyze and
characterize it as part of a "reasonable sequence of steps in a single con-
tinuous complaint" seems unnecessary and likely to lead the court to miss
the point of why or why not it should be admitted. Incidentally, in Regina
"See Regina v. Bell, 6 N.S.2d 351, at 359-60, 14 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 225, at
232 (1973).
6Id. The court held however that the Crown does not have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the complaint they are offering into evidence is the first com-
plaint.p [19731 6 W.W.R. 29, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 166 (Alta.).
98Id. at 34, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 170.
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v. Volk,"' the Alberta Court of Appeal directed a new trial because the trial
judge had excluded evidence of the second complaint. Since it was a trial
by judge alone, and since the trial judge had heard the offer to prove the
second complaint, the Court of Appeal appears to have great confidence-
more than most people-that when a trial judge hears evidence but then
rules it inadmissible and directs himself to ignore it, he in fact ignores it.
The Court of Appeal stated that they were directing a new trial because
the second complaint might "have assisted [the trial judge] in forming an
opinion as to the credibility of the complainant's evidence .... 100 The
accused who presumably had to go through the agony of a new trial in this
case probably wishes the trial judge who had acquitted him in the first
instance had simply asked himself whether the second complaint would have
so assisted him rather than, presumably, whether the statement formed "a
reasonable sequence of steps in a single continuous complaint". 101
As mentioned earlier, a witness's prior consistent statement is generally
excluded because it is superfluous. Whatever probative value it possesses is
outweighed by the time that its proof and disproof will consume. As Lord
Pearce said in a slightly different context: "Many controversies which might
thus obliquely throw some light on the issues must in practice be discarded
because there is not an infinity of time, money and mental comprehension
available to make use of them." 10 This being the reason for the exclusion
of recent complaints, one would have thought that if inadvertent mention
was made in a trial of a complaint that was held not to be recent, the logical
way to cure the error would be to permit the other side to contest the exis-
tence of the complaint if it was of any probative value whatsoever. If the
complaint was made so long after the event to be of no probative value,
then of course an inadvertent mention can do no harm whatsoever. Yet
the court's continue to order new trials if a complaint that is not recent is
mentioned during the course of a trial. In Regina v. Reinson,, a police
constable, when asked if he saw anyone at a service station he was directed
to go to, replied: "Yes, we saw the young lady who had phoned in previously
complaining of rape." ' The trial judge interrupted the police constable
and upon finding that the complaint he mentioned was not recent, ordered
a mistrial. Ordering a mistrial when evidence is admitted, that to save the
time of the court should have been excluded, would appear to simply com-
pound the effect of the error.
The judge in Reinson justified his decision to order a new trial by
stating: "Anyone on that jury who cannot fully disabuse his mind of what
was said by the officer will undoubtedly say here is a girl who says that she
99 Id.
10 Id., 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 171.
11Id., 24 Can. Crim. (ts.) at 170.
102Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1965] A.C. 595, at 607, [1965] 1
All E.R. 506, at 511.
,03 16 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 415 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1973).
104 Id. at 416.
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was raped and that is clear-cut evidence that she was, and she told that to
this policeman." " How is it that judges and lawyers realize that a com-
plaint that was not made fairly soon after an alleged crime is of little
probative value, but jurors are so unintelligent that they cannot be disabused
of the notion, even after being instructed by the judge, that such a complaint
is almost conclusive evidence of the accused's guilt? Fortunately the danger
of misleading the jury is not often given as a reason for excluding complaints
that are not recent.
If a complaint is made as the result of questioning by a third person,
it is frequently excluded. The alleged victim, particularly if he is a young
child, might be led to acquiesce in the suggestions made to him, and thus
such a complaint is of little probative value. Although some courts strictly
apply the rule that a complaint elicited by questioning is inadmissible, in
Regina v. Bell, " the Nova Scotia Appeal Court recognized that the question
is really one of the probative value of the complaint, and thus they held
that a complaint was admissible even though it was made after repeated
questioning since the victim's initial silence could be explained by her state
of fear.
V. HEARSAY
A. Hearsay Rule in Quebec
Although the practice in Quebec has always been to apply the hearsay
rule, it was not until this year that the Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether the hearsay rule, in law, applied in Quebec. In Royal Vic-
toria Hospital v. Morrow, 107 Justice Pigeon, delivering the judgment of
the Court, reasoned that although there was no express provision in the
Quebec Civil Code or the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, certain articles
in those Codes implied that the hearsay rule governed the trial of cases over
matters in which the Province of Quebec had jurisdiction.
Justice Pigeon found an implicit exclusion of hearsay evidence in Article
294 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That article provides: "Except where
otherwise provided, in any contested case, the witnesses are examined in
open court, the opposite party being present or duly notified . . . ."I"
Justice Pigeon reasoned: "By admitting hearsay evidence, not only is the
provision requiring examination of witnesses in open Court evaded, but that
requiring an oath or solemn affirmation as well, to say nothing of the right
to cross-examine." '"
An argument by deduction from a statute is always difficult, and one
would have felt a little more comfortable with Justice Pigeon's argument if
"03d. at 418.
"' Supra note 95.
"42 D.LR.3d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
"'OCode of Civil Procedure, Que. Stat. 1965 c. 80.
I" Supra note 107, at 237.
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his judgment had revealed an examination of the history of the article. He
notes that it was essentially the same as article 363 of the 1867 Code. The
history of that article was in turn not explored. It might well have emerged
from the ascendency of the principle of publicity over the principle of
secrecy in continental civil procedure; an ascendency which was clearly not
intended to bring the hearsay rule in its wake. "'
Justice Pigeon found further support for his argument by deduction
from specific sections in the Codes that appeared to create exceptions to
article 294. For instance, article 320 provides for the admissibility of testi-
mony that corresponds with the common law hearsay exception for former
testimony. If there was no hearsay rule in Quebec, article 294 would be
"deprived of any meaning", Justice Pigeon reasoned.
In view of the above two articles in the Code of Civil Procedure, and
the reasoning applied by Justice Pigeon, one might have supposed that the
hearsay rule applied in civil litigation in Quebec, and that the only excep-
tions to it were those expressly provided in the Code. However, Justice
Pigeon went on to hold that the hearsay rule as developed in England was
adopted in Quebec in all its aspects. He deduced this from article 1206
of the Civil Code which provides: "When no provision is found in this code
for the proof of facts concerning commercial matters, recourse must be had
to the rules of evidence laid down by the laws of England." "'
There are two readily apparent problems with the application of this
section to the case before the Supreme Court. Firstly, it is expressly re-
stricted to commercial matters; the case before the court involved a civil
matter. Justice Pigeon got around this by reasoning that to interpret the
provision as applying only to commercial matters "would be to run counter
to general principles". 112 Secondly, Justice Pigeon had earlier held that
article 294 of the Code of Civil Procedure impliedly excluded hearsay testi-
mony. Surely article 1206 should not be read to hold that if a provision
in the Code excludes testimony, but the common law would admit the testi-
mony, the common law rule of admission overrides the Code's rule of ex-
clusion.
Perhaps the best one can say is that any argument from deduction from
a Code that is the obvious result of ad hoc judgments is going to be tenuous.
Therefore, it is unfortunate the Supreme Court did not reason from the
legal culture in Quebec, the history of rules of procedure, and the efficacy
of the hearsay rule.
B. Definition of Hearsay
While the hearsay rule may be, as Wigmore declared, "that most char-
110 Millar, The Formative Principle of Civil Procedure-III, 18 ILL. L. R.V. 150,
at 156 (1923-24).
... QUEBEC CIVIL CODE.
12 Supra note 107, at 239.
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acteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence", " except at the
most elementary level it is also the most misunderstood. Indeed, it is per-
haps not too much to suggest that the only reported case in which the ques-
tion of what is hearsay was intelligently addressed by the courts took four
separate trials lasting eight years and involved the participation of most of
England's greatest jurists. 114 The House of Lords eventually held in that
case that conduct from which the actor's belief was to be inferred was hear-
say; thus, the fact that certain persons had written the deceased testator
letters from the contents of which it could be assumed that they regarded him
as sane and rational was excluded as proof of the fact that he was sane and
rational. Judges seldom recognize the problem that evidence of conduct
might be hearsay, thus there is no Canadian case where Wright v. Tatham
has been applied. But the problem probably arises more frequently than
generally assumed. For instance, this year in Re Beukenkamp, "' evidence
that a person did not complain of non-delivery was admitted without discus-
sion as tending to prove that certain shares were delivered. If the person
who was alleged to have received the shares had made an out-of-court state-
ment to the effect that he had received the shares, his statement would be
clearly recognized as hearsay. To prove delivery, he would have to take
the witness stand. A strong argument both in principle, based on the
dangers that the hearsay rule is designed to minimize, and on the authority
of Wright v. Tatham could be made for holding that the person's silence
from which the court is being asked to infer that the shares were delivered is
equally hearsay.
The problem of whether certain evidence was hearsay also arose in
Regina v. Bencardino. "' A witness initially gave evidence for the Crown.
Later he was recalled by the defence and repudiated everything that he had
testified about on behalf of the Crown. On cross-examination, he denied
that he changed his testimony as the result of threats. To prove that the
witness had changed his testimony as the result of threats that were made
to him while he was in prison, the prosecution wished to offer the following
evidence. The witness's lawyer (the witness was also involved in the crime
charged but had been previously convicted) had approached the prosecutor
and asked him if his client could be transferred to another prison. He in-
formed the prosecutor that his client told him that he had been approached
on a number of occasions and had been threatened with respect to the testi-
mony he gave at the trial. The prosecution wished to call the lawyer to the
stand to give this testimony to prove that the witness had been threatened.
One of the important issues in the case was to what extent this offered
evidence was hearsay.
113 V WIGMoRr § 1365, at 28.
114 Wright v. Tatham, 5 C1. & F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (1838). For detailed
history of the case, see Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the
Thicket, 14 V~AD. L. RPv. 741, at 749-60 (1961).
115[1973] F.C. 1401, 43 D.L.R.3d 118 (T.D.).
"' Supra note 58.
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The trial judge ruled that the lawyer could not testify as to what the
witness had told him about threats that he had received, but he could testify
as to what, as a result, he had told the Crown prosecutor, including the fact
that the witness had said he was threatened. The ruling brings to a logical
conclusion the common sophistry surrounding the hearsay rule that a person
cannot tell the court what another person said to him, but he can testify as
to what he did as a result of what that person said to him. In this case,
as a result of what the witness told him, the lawyer went to the prosecutor
and told him what the witness had said to him. The ruling that what the
lawyer told the prosecutor is admissible is a triumph of form over logic,
reason, experience and substance. The Court of Appeal, fortunately, did
not appear to have too much trouble concluding that "what [the lawyer]
said to [the prosecutor] is not evidence of anything". :" The Court of
Appeal then went on to hold that what the witness told his lawyer about his
"plight" in the prison was itself directly admissible. The court stated: "No
question of hearsay will arise because the evidence will be received not to
prove the fact of intimidation but rather to prove [the witness'] state of mind
of fear." 118 Although it appears for a moment that the court understands
the hearsay rule, such optimism is dashed in the next line. In support of
their holding that the statements made by the witness to the lawyer are not
hearsay, the court first cites Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, "" in which
the Privy Council held the statements in issue in that case were not hearsay
since they were being tendered not to prove the truth of the statements, but
simply to prove they were made, and then Wigmore whom the court says
"classifies such evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule". "' In fact
the evidence that Wigmore classifies as an exception to the hearsay rule in
the chapter cited by the court, "' is very different than the evidence dealt
with by the Privy Council in Subramanian.
It is unclear from the Court of Appeal's reasons for judgment in Ben-
cardino the exact evidence that the lawyer will give at the new trial. How-
ever, by exploring the possibilities, the confusion in the Court of Appeal's
judgment can best be exposed, and, incidentally, the inconsistencies in the
hearsay rule. In analyzing offered evidence, it is of course always necessary
to be precise about the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.
In this case, the Crown wishes to prove that the witness had changed his
testimony as the result of threats.
Firstly, for the purpose of proving that the witness was threatened, the
lawyer might testify, and it appears from the report that this at least in part
would be the substance of his testimony, that the witness told him: "I have
been threatened with respect to the testimony that I have given at trial."
"I Id. at 358, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 180.
118 Id., 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 181.
129 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965, 100 Sol. J. 566 (P.C.) (Malaya).
12
0 Supra note 58, at 358, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 181.
121 See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., vol. 6, sub-title 2, topic 13 (as it was
cited by the court): VI WIGMORE §§ 1714-40, at 57-130.
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This testimony clearly would be hearsay. Subramaniam v. Public Prosecu-
tor, cited by the court, would not support its admissibility. In that case,
like the present case, a person's state of mind was in issue (in that case the
accused's, in the present case a witness's), and therefore the truth or falsity
of the threats was irrelevant. However, in Subramaniam, a person who
heard the threats, namely the accused, testified that the threats were in fact
made. In Bencardino, no one with personal knowledge testified that the
threats were made. The lawyer's testimony that the witness told him: "I
have been threatened ..... " is hearsay.
Secondly, for the purpose of showing that the witness changed his testi-
mony because he was in fear of what might happen if he did not, the lawyer
might testify that the witness told him: "I am in fear of my life because of
threats made to me respecting the testimony I gave at trial." At least part
of this statement might be admissible as being a declaration of the witness's
mental state. This is the exception to the hearsay rule that Wigmore dis-
cusses in the chapter referred to by the court as authority for its holding.
The nuances of the exception would take a separate article to explore.
Thirdly, the Crown might attempt to show the witness' state of mind by
leading circumstantial evidence from which his state of mind could be infer-
red. For instance, the lawyer might testify that when he saw his client he
acted in a fearful manner and asked to be transferred to a safer place, and
perhaps said things such as: "I should never have given the testimony I did."
From this evidence, it could be inferred that he was fearful of life unless he
changed his testimony. Such non-assertive conduct would be held to be
hearsay according to the reasoning of Wright v. Tatham. However, all
subsequent cases would hold that no hearsay problem arises since no direct
assertions by the witness of fear or threats are being admitted.
This breakdown perhaps reveals the inconsistencies of the hearsay rule
as it is presently applied. All three kinds of evidence are being admitted
to prove that the witness changed his testimony out of fear for his life-all
suffer the same frailties, although perhaps to different degrees. Therefore,
there is a strong argument to be made that all the evidence mentioned should
be excluded by the hearsay rule, or at least an examination made of each
offered item of evidence to determine the degree to which the hearsay dangers
are present.
The case reveals that an analysis of the definition of hearsay based on
rigid classification is doomed to sophistry. If we are to retain a hearsay
rule, at the very least the courts ought to adopt an approach to defining and
therefore excluding testimony on the grounds that it is hearsay which in-
volves an analysis of the dangers stemming from its admission.
In Bencardino, the witness had denied on cross-examination that a
third person told him that he had to change his testimony. An interesting
question arises, aside from the hearsay question, as to whether the lawyer
can take the stand and testify, in effect, that the witness had told him that
someone had so approached him. It is clearly a statement that is inconsis-
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tent with the witness's present testimony and that does not relate to the
subject matter of the case, as required by section 10 of the Canada Evidence
Act.
Testimony is more clearly not hearsay when its probative value in no
way depends upon the veracity of an out-of-court declarant. A criminal
case from Prince Edward Island illustrates the admissibility of a statement
that is clearly tendered for a non-hearsay purpose. The accused received
a package of marijuana in a letter and had the package, unwrapped, in her
pocket when arrested for possession of marijuana. The letter did not refer
to the marijuana and the accused sought to have it introduced at trial as
tending to prove that she did not realize that the package contained mari-
juana. The letter was not of course being introduced to prove the truth of
the matter asserted in the letter, but rather to suppport the accused's testi-
mony that she had no knowledge that marijuana was contained in the package.
The court admitted the letter. 12
C. Admissions
1. Definition
If a person makes an admission, such evidence is admissible despite the
fact that the statement was made out of court. Commentators have debated
whether admissions are admissible because they constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule, satisfy the hearsay rule, or are essentially circumstantial
evidence and consequently lie outside the hearsay rule. "33 The courts have
never analyzed the admissibility of admissions in these terms. This is un-
fortunate since the rationale for the admissibility of admissions resolves many
practical questions; for instance, what is an "admission"? The rationale of
the admissibility of admissions should of course determine what is an admis-
sion. Without exploring here the various theories frequently advanced, it is
probable that the only explanation of their admissibility that can adequately
justify the peculiarities of their admissibility, namely that they are admissible
even though self-serving when made, even though the party had no personal
knowledge of the fact he admitted and even though he phrased his admission
in terms of an otherwise inadmissible opinion, is the psychological explana-
tion advanced by McCormick:
This notion that it does not lie in the opponent's mouth to question the
trustworthiness of his own declarations is an expression of feeling rather
than logic but it is an emotion so universal that it may stand for a reason.
The feeling that one is entitled to use the opponent's words is heightened
by our contentious or adversary system of litigation. 1
24
112 R. v. Partridge, 5 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 420, 15 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 434 (P.E.I.
1973).
'
23 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at t 262.
124 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 239, at 503 (1954).
This insight into the explanation of the admissibility of admissions, like many others
of McCormick's sometimes subtle but always thought-provoking insights into the rules
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This being the rationale of admissions, it follows that anything that a party
says out of court should be able to be used against him, if relevant, at trial.
In Royal Victoria Hospital v. Morrow, " Mr. Justice Pigeon held that
a statement made by the doctor-defendant before an allegedly negligently
conducted operation was not admissible against him since it was not an ad-
mission. That, he said, "is not doubtful". .. However, unless a rationale
for the admissibility of admissions is postulated, then it is difficult to per-
ceive why it "is not doubtful". If the rationale suggested above is accepted
then, as mentioned, anything a party has said out of court should be able to
be used against him. Justice Pigeon assumed that a person could only make
an admission with respect to an act after the act had occurred. Even as a
matter of ordinary usage it is difficult to see why this should be so. In
ordinary usage an admission means an acknowledgement or an acceptance
that something is true. If a person can admit a fact after an event from
which it can be inferred that he performed an act in a certain fashion, why
cannot he admit a fact before the event from which it can be inferred that he
performed it in a certain fashion?
2. Implied Admissions (Silence)
A party may expressly make an admission, or he may by his conduct
imply that he accepts as true a statement made by some other person, and
thus make what has been called an adoptive admission. Most of the cases
that arise with respect to admissions involve adoptive admissions. The
question in issue is usually whether or not a party or the accused's conduct
following a statement by another person amounted to an adoption of it
Silence in the face of an accusation may be found to be conduct amounting
to an acquiescence in the truth of the accusation, and three cases this year
dealt with this problem.
The theory of accepting silence, without more, as evidence of the
acquiscence in an accusation is that normally a person would deny an ac-
cusation if it were untrue. The fact that he remained silent is thus evidence
from which it can be inferred that he admitted the allegation. A reply that
does not amount to a denial can also be treated as an acquiescence since it
is the lack of denial that is significant. In civil cases, the courts have not
experienced great difficulty in evaluating all the circumstances surrounding
a particular case and determining whether the silence of one of the parties
amounted to an adoption of a statement made in his presence. In Mac-
Kenzie v. Commer, ", the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sold him
a stolen car. As evidence tending to prove that the car was stolen, the
of evidence, was left out of the second edition of McCormick. The editors of the
second edition simply conclude: "On balance the most satisfactory justification of the
admissibility of admissions is that they are the product of the adversary system .
McCoiauLcM supra note 7, 262, at 629.
1 Supra note 107.
"2 Id. at 240.
176 N.S.2d 707, 44 D.L.R.3d 473 (1973).
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plaintiff testified that when he telephoned the defendant and informed him
that the police had seized the car alleging it was stolen the defendant replied
"'go pile sand". The court found that this amounted to an admission by the
defendant that the car was stolen. Chief Justice MacKeigan reasoned: "One
would expect a normal honest vendor, when told that he had stolen goods, to
deny the allegation vehemently . . . . Under these circumstances, [the
defendant] must be taken to have impliedly admitted the truth of the al-
legations." 128
In criminal cases, one might have supposed that the courts would be
much more reticent to rule that the accused's silence in the face of an accusa-
tion could be regarded as an admission. The accused has a right to remain
silent, use of his silence as an adoptive admission seems inconsistent with this
right and indeed seriously erodes its value. Furthermore, people's reaction
to a serious accusation, particularly by the police, is unpredictable. Also
there is a danger of prejudice to the defendant's case if the jury hears that
he remained silent in the face of an accusation and that they can use such
evidence for the purpose of inferring that he admitted the accusation. In
spite of this, the courts have been extremely liberal in admitting silence as
evidence of an adoptive admission in criminal cases. The leading case is
The King v. Christie, where Lord Reading stated:
If the accused denied the truth of the statement when it was made, and
there was nothing in his conduct and demeanor from which the jury, not-
withstanding his denial, could infer that he acknowledged its truth in whole
or in part, the practice of the judges has been to exclude it altogether. 1l
If the accused expressly denies an allegation made to him, it is difficult to
conceive of conduct on his part which might imply that he was at the same
time accepting the statement. Yet, in Christie, in spite of a denial, the state-
ment was admitted.
A similar case, except it did not involve an accusation made by the
police, was reported in 1974. In Regina v. Thompson, I the accused was
charged with rape. Evidence was led that shortly after the rape was re-
ported the accused's father had asked him: "Did you hurt Karen?" The
accused replied: "No, Dad, I didn't." Following this conversation, the ac-
cused's father left the house, and the accused turned to some other people in
the room who had overheard the accused's conversation with his father and
said: "Guess what everyone, Dad thinks I hurt Karen." The trial judge
admitted this evidence as an implied admission by the accused. The Court
of Appeal, citing Christie, upheld the trial judge's ruling. They held that
if there was "any evidence in the accused's words, conduct or demeanor from
which a jury would conclude that the accused, despite words of denial, really
acknowledged or admitted the truth of the statement . . .", I the trial judge
128Mid. at 710, 44 D.IR.3d at 475.
129 [1914] A.C. 545, at 565, [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 63, at 71.
1308 N.S.2d 417, 26 Can. Crirn. (n.s.) 144 (1974).
131 Id. at 424, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 150.
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could admit the evidence. Since they could not say that there was no such
evidence, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's ruling. The Court
of Appeal did not say what in the case amounted to some evidence of adop-
tion. In an extract from the transcript reproduced in the reasons for
judgment of the Court of Appeal, it appears that a witness who had been
in the room with the accused at the time the statements were made testified
that when the accused said, "Guess what everyone, Dad thinks I hurt
Karen", he looked "Kind of choked up. He was scared". '"
The decision is troubling for two reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to
conceive of a less equivocal denial than "No, I didn't". If such a statement
can be turned into an admission of guilt because one witness (three witnesses
heard the accused make the statement and only one recalled his unusual
demeanor) testifies that when he said it he looked choked up and scared,
the accused has little protection against the admissility of out-of-court
accusations made against him, no matter by whom or how speculative they
are when made.
Secondly, the case continues the view that the question of whether the
accused admitted by his conduct the truth of an accusation made to him is
a question of conditional relevancy. That is to say, in order to admit the
evidence, the judge need merely find that there is sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding of adoption. He need not himself find that there was such
an adoption, that question he leaves to the jury. Indeed the Court of Appeal
said that the trial judge's responsibility in admitting the evidence was only
to find if there was "any evidence" of adoption, ' although probably the
judges equate "any evidence" with evidence sufficient to support a finding.
While this holding has the support of all the authorities on the point, perhaps
because of the prejudicial nature of such evidence, the trial judge should
exercise more control over its admissibility. A judge must of course find
that a confession was made voluntarily before it is admitted into evidence.
Perhaps the same standard of proof should apply with respect to the ad-
missibility of adoptive admissions, namely that the trial judge must find that
the accused admitted the accusation made to him before it is admissible. '"
Chief Justice MacKeigan writing the judgment of the court suggested that
in Regina v. Thompson the trial judge "could and in my respectful opinion
should have excluded the evidence as being of trifling probative value and
gravely prejudicial to the accused. .. ." "3 If his suggestion were to be fol-
lowed in future cases, perhaps the same result would be reached, and the
accused granted some protection from the admissibility of such prejudicial
evidence. Showing their real concern over the admissibility of this type of
evidence, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal while upholding the admission
1 Id. at 421, 26 Can. Crim. (ns.) at 148.
"3Id. at 424, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 150.
234See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 H~Av. L REv. 935, at 1039
(1966); Maguire & Vincent, Admissions Implied From Spoliation or Related Conduct,
45 YALE L.J. 226, at 259 (1935).
"I Supra note 130, at 424, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 152.
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of the evidence in Regina v. Thompson ordered a new trial because the trial
judge did not sufficiently explain the frailties of the evidence to the jury.
Another case reported this year also illustrates how far the courts have
gone with the notion that the accused can be taken to have admitted his
guilt in certain circumstances by remaining silent. "' This case is much
more troubling than the Thompson case because a policeman was involved;
the accused had been charged with the offence, indeed was in the courtroom
waiting for the trial to start, when the statements were made; none of the
statements were made directly to the accused, rather he simply overheard
them; and because Justice Martin who dealt with this aspect of the case in the
Ontario Court of Appeal showed none of the misgivings in holding the evi-
dence admissible that Chief Justice MacKeigan revealed in Thompson. The
accused and a co-accused were sitting in the prisoner's dock waiting for the
opening of the court. The co-accused beckoned to a police sergeant to
come over to the prisoner's dock. The co-accused then had a conversation
with the police officer in which he admitted certain facts related to the charge.
Some of the statements made in the conversation also implicated the accused.
While the accused took no part in the conversation, he was present through-
out it. Those parts of the conversation implicating the accused were ad-
mitted against him on the grounds that by his silence and conduct he had
admitted their truth. On appeal, defence counsel argued that the silence
of the accused did not indicate acquiescence, but rather could have been
explained by a number of factors, including the advice from his counsel.
Mr. Justice Martin, however, held:
There is much to be said for the view that [the accused's] mere
silence in the circumstances under which the statements were made would
not warrant an inference that he assented to their truth. The admissibility
of the incriminating statements as against [him], however, does not rest
solely upon his silence. There is evidence which, if accepted, would sup-
port an inference that [the accused] by his conduct and demeanor assented
to the statements which were made and which incriminated him. IsT
We are not told in what way the accused revealed his assent by his conduct
or demeanor.
These cases make a mockery of the accused's right to silence. It would
appear that a lawyer should advise his client that if anyone makes an ac-
cusation against him, within his hearing, he should immediately deny it and
look the person straight in the eye; he should not blush (from anger or em-
barrassment) as it will be taken as a sign of guilt; he should not smile (at the
ludicrousness of the idea) as it will be taken as a sign of guilt; he should
not get angry (because such an unfounded allegation would be made) or it
will be taken as a sign of guilt; and, he should not appear nervous (at the
thought of such an allegation) or it will be taken as a sign of guilt. Upon
reflection I wonder if looking a person straight in the eye is not a sure sign
a person is guilty, but trying to bluff his way out.
131 Regina v. Govedarov, 3 Ont.2d 23, 25 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 1 (1974).
137 id. at 63-64, 25 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 45.
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D. Former Testimony
1. Conditions of Admissibility
Statements given at any trial under oath and subject to cross-examina-
tion are likely to be more reliable than spontaneous exclamations, statements
against interest, or for that matter almost any other kind of statement ad-
mitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. And yet such statements cannot
be admitted at a subsequent trial unless numerous rigid conditions are met:
the declarant must be unavailable; the party against whom it is offered must
have had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the earlier trial;
the parties to the two trials must be identical or at least have privity; and
the issues in dispute at the two trials must be substantially identical. The
strictness with which the courts apply these conditions is illustrated in Re
G. 2as
Re G. was a custody action which in part turned upon the paternity
of the child. The mother of the child was dead. The applicant was the
mother's first husband, the respondent her second husband. Although the
child was conceived while the mother was married to the applicant, the re-
spondent sought to introduce, among other things, testimony given at two
prior trials in order to prove that the applicant was not the father of the
child. Unfortunately it is not clear from the judgment exactly what testi-
mony from these prior proceedings the respendent wished to introduce, nor
the exact issues in those proceedings. In the first proceeding, the mother
was granted a nullity of her marriage to the applicant. The second pro-
ceeding was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by the respondent against
a relative of the mother to recover possession of the child. The judge dis-
missed the question of the admissibility of transcripts from either of these
proceedings by simply noting that the parties in these proceedings were dif-
ferent than the parties in the present case. "
Although other reasons may be suggested for the strict pre-conditions
for the admissibility of former testimony, to be consistent with the rationale
of at least most of the hearsay exceptions, the conditions must be assumed
to be required to ensure the reliability of the offered evidence. That is to
say, the conditions ensure that the testimony at the previous hearing was
thoroughly cross-examined. But that being so, then obviously the condi-
tions are stated too narrowly. The previous testimony will be thoroughly
cross-examined so long as the party cross-examining had the same motive
and interest in cross-examining as the party in the present proceeding. Thus
there would appear to be no reason why the parties in the two cases must
be identical or even why the issues must necessarily be identical. It is no
answer to this argument to say that the present party did not have the op-
portunity to cross-examine because he does not have that opportunity with
respect to any other evidence admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule,
1 Ont.2d 318, 40 D.LR.3d 196 (Surr. C1. 1973).
' Id. at 323, 40 D.L.R.3d at 203.
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and that alone does not render it inadmissible. The arbitrariness of the
conditions requiring the parties to be identical can be illustrated in Re G.
by reference to the nullity proceeding. If the respondent wished to intro-
duce testimony given by the mother in the nullity proceeding why should
he be prohibited from doing so simply because he was not a party to that
proceeding? If the applicant, who was defending the nullity application, had
the same motive and interest in cross-examining the mother's testimony in the
nullity proceeding as he would have in the custody proceeding, he can hardly
be heard to complain that the testimony in the nullity proceeding is unreliable
because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine it. Unfortunately
in Re G., the judge never addressed himself to the rationale of the rule, he
simply repeated the tired formula of the rule taken from Phipson on Evidence.
2. Criminal Code, Section 643
A statutory provision, section 643 of the Criminal Code, 14, provides,
among other things, that if a person who gave testimony at a preliminary
inquiry is unavailable at the trial of the charge, his testimony at the prelimi-
nary inquiry "may be read as evidence in the proceedings". An issue that
has arisen fairly frequently is whether the trial judge has a discretion under
the section to rule that such evidence is inadmissible even though all the
necessary conditions in the section are satisfied. Two cases reported this
year dealt with the issue. In Regina v. Moore, 14 Madame Justice Van
Camp held that she did have a discretion under the section to exclude the
testimony. She exercised that discretion in the case to exclude the testi-
mony given by a rape victim at a preliminary inquiry. She did not feel that
the credibility of the victim could be fairly assessed from the transcript of her
former testimony and since it was the only significant evidence implicating
the accused she concluded that it should be excluded. Madame Justice
Van Camp rested her decision that the section confers a discretion largely on
the basis of authority. However other aspects of her reasons for judg-
ment are interesting. For instance she said that she did not feel bound to
hold that the section did not give her a discretion to exclude the evidence
because it has been held that other sections in the Evidence Act (perhaps
section 12) that are similarly worded, have been held not to confer such a
discretion. She stated that "each section and each Act must stand on its
own". 14" This seems to reflect an enlightened purposive approach to statu-
tory construction. She also distinguished the troubling case of The Queen v.
Wray ", on the basis that in that case "the Court was considering whether
evidence should be rejected because it might bring the administration of
justice into disrepute and because it was unfair". 14 Many judges have felt
140 CAN. R V. STAT. c. C-34 (1970).
I'l 17 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 348 (Ont. High Ct. 1973).
412 Id. at 349.
143 [1971] Sup. Ct. 272, [1970] 4 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. (n.s.) 1.
I" Supra note 141, at 350.
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that Wray limits their discretion to exclude evidence in every case, but the
case should be restricted to its facts.
Later in the year, the Ontario Court of Appeal overruled Justice Van
Camp's ruling. In Regina v. Tretter, " Justice Martin delivering the judg-
ment of the court held that section 643 of the Criminal Code does not give
a trial judge the discretion to exclude the testimony of a witness given at the
preliminary inquiry. The court reached this decision on the basis of a
literal reading of section 643. Mr. Justice Martin pointed out that if the
intent of the section was to give the trial judge a discretion it would provide:
"The Court may permit the evidence to be read."'" The section reads
that the prior testimony "may be read as evidence".
It would be incongruous if the trial judge had the discretion to exclude
former testimony under section 643 of the Criminal Code but did not have
such a discretion with respect to other exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
trial judge could perhaps exclude such testimony pursuant to an overriding
discretion to exclude evidence that might mislead the jury. However the
better approach would be for the trial judge to admit such testimony, but if
at the end of the case it is the only evidence in the case implicating the ac-
cused to direct an acquittal on the basis that the evidence is unsufficient to
support a finding of guilty.
E. Statements Against Interest
One of the most difficult issues that arises with respect to a statement
offered as a "statement against interest" is simply the determination of when
a statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant.
This issue arose in Gallant v. Burke's Estate. " The court avoided the issue
by assuming without discussion that the statement in the case was "a state-
ment against interest". The plaintiff sued the estate of the deceased for
services that he had rendered to the deceased before his death. The plain-
tiff alleged at trial that he had looked after the deceased, assisted him to bed
nightly and performed other services on the understanding that he would
be monetarily compensated. Another witness, however, testified that the
deceased had told her that the plaintiff was rendering him services simply
for the right to live on a lot owned by the deceased. One of the issues in
the case was whether this statement made by the deceased to the witness was
admissible. The judge held that the statement was "a statement against the
interest of the deceased and for that reason falls under one of the exceptions
to the "hearsay" rule". " As well as foregoing any discussion, the judge
cited no authorities to support his holding. Even a superficial analysis of
the rationale for the hearsay exception for "declarations against interest"
would have led the judge to realize that the answer to the question posed
"'18 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 82, 26 Can. Crim. (ns.) 153 (Ont. 1974).
"'Id. at 90, 26 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 161.
1475 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 366 (P.E.I. Sup. CL 1973).
4 Id. at 368.
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in the case deserved more consideration. Statements against interest are
assumed to be sufficiently trustworthy to qualify as an exception to the hear-
say rule on the basis that people do not normally admit facts that are against
their pecuniary interest unless they believe such facts to be true. In order to
satisfy the rationale, then, the judge must find that at the time the statement
was made it was to such an axtent against the declarant's pecuniary interest
that the declarant would not have made it unless he believed it to be true.
The court did not seem to realize that the statement in issue in the case had
a double aspect. If, when making the statement to the witness, the question
was whether the deceased had agreed to give the plaintiff anything for his
services, then his statement would be against his interest; if the issue was
whether the deceased agreed to give the plaintiff a monetary compensation
as well as the freeuse of his land, then the statement was not against his in-
terest but self-serving.
Practical justifications-the difficulty of inquiring into the declarant's
subjective state of mind at the time he made the statement-perhaps foreclose
implementing in every case the rationale of the exception. However, ac-
cepting the rationale of the exception as being an accurate guideline for
human behaviour, all that can be inferred from the deceased's statement is
that the deceased had agreed to give the accused at least free rent for the
services rendered. It should not be admitted for the purpose of showing
that he did not agree to give a larger amount. Since this was the only
issue in the case, the statement should have been excluded. Any intelligent
layman would consider such a proposition nonsense and would urge that the
statement and the surrounding circumstances should be admitted for what
they are worth. However the rationale of the rule, that people are sincere
only when making statements against interest, would foreclose use of the
statement in the case for any purpose other than proving that the compensa-
tion was at the least free rent. 149
F. Hospital Records
Under section 52 of the Ontario Evidence Act, I"' and under the Evi-
dence Acts of most other provinces, "' a party can introduce into evidence
a medical report without having to call to the stand the medical doctor who
prepared it. An issue that has been raised under the section is whether a
party can have a medical report introduced into evidence pursuant to the
section and still call at the trial the medical doctor who prepared it. In a
case reported this year, Justice Brooke, writing the judgment of the Ontario
Court of Appeal, held that normally a trial judge should require a party to
elect as to which of the two courses he will follow. " So long as the judg-
ment is read so as to permit a trial judge in his discretion to allow a party
to both file a medical report as an exhibit and call the reporting doctor the
14 C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 7, at 279.15 0ONT. REv. STAT. c. 151 (1970).
151 See J. SOPINKA & S. LEDERMAN, supra note 63, at 90 n. 175 (1974).
152 Ferraro v. Lee, 2 Ont.2d 417, 43 D.L.R.3d 161 (1974).
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decision will do no harm. Unfortunately the whole thrust of Justice Brook's
reasons for julgment is that such a course should be exceptional. Indeed
he states: "This section was not to provide for the introduction into evi-
dence of a medical report when it was the intention of a plaintiff to call the
doctor to give viva voce evidene... ."' It is unclear how Justice Brooke
divined the intention of the section. Certainly there is nothing on the face
of the section to suggest this was not its intention. Justice Brooke reasoned
that the purpose of the section was "to do away with unnecessary surprise
with respect to medical evidence, to dispense with unnecessary attendance
of medical practitioners.., to assure that the control as to when such reports
might be admitted in evidence remained with the trial Judge". ' However,
surely one of the purposes was to ensure that medical testimony is presented
in the most intelligible manner possible. One manner of achieving this
purpose would be to file with the court for examination a medical report,
and then call the doctor who prepared the report to take the stand to explain
and clarify his report. Indeed anytime an expert is going to be called to
give testimony, one would have thought it would be of great assistance to
the trier of fact to be able to peruse a written report prepared by him. It
would almost always be time-saving and create less confusion. That the
intelligible presentation of medical testimony was one of the purposes of
the legislation is clear from its legislative history, the practice in other juris-
dictions with similar sections pre-dating the Ontario legislation, and the fact
that the difficulty of understanding medical testimony was a frequent cause
of concern prior to the introduction of the legislation. ' Justice Brooke
asks: "With respect, if the doctor's attendance is necessary to explain the
report, what is the value in filing the report at all? It is in that event an
incomplete statement . . . ." ' Surely the court could have taken judicial
notice of the fact that an oral presentation is often much easier to under-
stand if preceded by a written report. Has anyone ever suggested that
counsel on appeal should be compelled to elect whether to make written
presentation or oral argument? A trial judge always has a discretion to
exclude evidence if he finds it superfluous or confusing. However, where a
party has had a medical report admitted into evidence pursuant to section
52 and then wishes to call the doctor to the stand to give oral testimony
explaining and clarifying the report, one would have thought that only in ex-
ceptional cases would the trial judge exclude this testimony. If the trial
judge finds the oral testimony superfluous, he can always order the party
calling the doctor to pay an appropriate amount as costs.
'Id. at 419, 43 D.L.R.3d at 163.
L%4 Id.
1  ONTARIo ATTORNEY-GENERAL's CoMMrrrEE ON MEDicAL EviDENCE IN COURT
IN CrviL CAsEs (1965).
"
56Supra note 152, at 420, 43 D.L.R.3d at 164.
1'5 See Snyder v. Siutters, [1970] 3 Ont. 789, at 790, 14 D.L.R.3d 173, at 174
(High Ct.); cited and disapproved by Brooke, J.A. in Ferraro v. Lee, supra note 152,
at 419, 43 D.L.R.3d at 163.
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In a case decided four months before Ferraro v. Lee, the same panel of
the Ontario Court of Appeal had held that a trial judge should not have per-
mitted a doctor's report to be admitted into evidence after the doctor had
completed his testimony. "58 The report contained material that the doctor
had not testified about and which was very damaging to the opposite party.
It is not clear from the case why the report was admitted into evidence after
the doctor gave his oral testimony, or why the doctor did not testify about
the matters in the report while giving his testimony, or why the matter could
not have been cured by having the doctor recalled to be cross-examined on
the material in the report. It is also interesting that the Ontario Court of
Appeal did not decide the case on the general point, that normally a party
cannot introduce a report and call the doctor.
G. Statements of Family History
Family history, such as births, deaths, marriages and legitimacy are
nowadays most frequently proved by the introduction of public records re-
cording these events. However, occasionally a party has to invoke one of
the numerous hearsay exceptions that evolved hundreds of years ago to assist
in proof of these matters. This year, two cases dealt with the introduction
of a statement of a deceased relative to prove pedigree.
Statements concerning family history by an unavailable declarant are
one of the oldest hearsay exceptions. When public records were not kept,
their necessity was obvious. As well certain conditions were established
which purported to guarantee their trustworthiness. The major condition
for reliability of the statement, and the condition which was in dispute in
both of the reported cases, is the requirement that the statement had been
made ante litem motam (before litigation was in contemplation). The
meaning and application of this condition has resulted in much senseless
litigation. Mr. Justice Dickson's judgment of the Supreme Court in Porteous
v. Dorn " suggests that the courts might finally be taking a sensible approach
to the issue.
The requirement that statements as to pedigree to be admissible must
have been made before a controversy arises is based on the theory that
statements made after a controversy arises are likely to be biased and un-
reliable. However, this objective, to exclude unreliable testimony, would
be more nearly achieved if the test for exclusion was simply-was the state-
ment made under circumstances such that the declarant had a motive for
not telling the truth? This test would be easier to apply than the test of
whether the statement was made ante litem motam and it would more nearly
achieve the objectives of the requirement. In some situations, the applica-
tion of the test would be broader than the strict common law requirement-
158 Gazdig v. Desjardins, I Ont.2d 457, 40 D.L.R.3d 649 (1973).
159 [1974] 6 W.W.R. 176, 45 D.L.R.3d 596 (Sup. Ct.).
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a declarant might have an obvious motive to lie even though there was no
controversy; in other situations, its application might be narrower--even after
a controversy has arisen a declarant might have no reason to falsify matters
of pedigree.
In Porteous v. Dorn, in order to prove that the claimant's mother and
father were never married, a statement of claim in which her mother had
sued her father for wages as a housekeeper and a settlement agreement were
introduced. Both documents were in effect statements by the parties that
they were not married. The trial judge ruled them inadmissible on the basis
that the statements in them were made ante litem motam. Justice Dickson,
in holding they were admissible, found that there was no "Us mota" between
the parties:
There was nothing to incline Mrs. Gulka to falsehood in casting herself in
the role of housekeeper and employee, and every reason for Mr. Rosen-
meyer to plead marriage in defence of the claim if the facts had supported
such a plea. No such defence was raised. I find nothing in the circum-
stances surrounding the agreement to cast doubt on the trustworthiness or
efficacy of that document in negation of a married status and would, there-
fore, hold it to be a declaration as to pedigree and admissible as such with-
out limitation. 10
If this is the manner in which the question of whether a statement was
made ante litem motanz will be decided in the future, then the courts might
as well go directly to the issue of motive to falsify. In Re G, "' statements
as to pedigree made at a nullity action were held inadmissible because they
were made ante litem motam. An analysis might have revealed that even
though there was a controversy about the validity of the marriage of the two
parties, neither party would have any motive to falsify evidence about the
paternity of the child in question in Re G.
H. Declarations of Public Rights
When a case involves historical facts, for instance a claim based on
aboriginal rights which depends upon the historical use and occupation of
land, the hearsay rule would obviously provide an insurmountable barrier
to the determination of the facts since no living person would have personal
knowledge of the facts in issue. Thus, in Re Paulette, Mr. Justice Morrow
provided:
[Iln my treatment of the sometimes repetitious statement of the many
Indian witnesses as to what their ancestors did, I have considered them as
coming within the exception to the hearsay rule relating to declarations of
deceased persons about matters of public and general rights: Millrrpum
et at. v. Mabalco Pty. Ltd. et at (1971) 17 F.LR. 141). St
'
60 Id. at 181, 45 D.L.R.3d at 602.
16' Supra note 138.
'15 42 D.L.R.3d 8, at 19-20 (N.W.T. Sup. Ct. 1973).
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VI. CORROBORATION
Proof in primitive legal systems was largely determined by counting
witnesses. Indeed, in some systems different weight was attached a priori to
the testimony of different witnesses. The testimony of a landowner might
be equal to that of three setfs, or as one Code provided: "In civil cases
evidence is only valid if given by two males, or by one male and two
females." 1" In a rational legal system, it would appear obvious that the
weight to be attached to evidence should be a matter of quality not quantity,
and class interests should not be reflected in the assessment. Tested against
such criteria, our present system of proof totters mid-way between a primitive
and rational system. While generally we trust the factfinder's ability to sub-
jectively evaluate the evidence, the testimony of some witnesses must be
corroborated, and the testimony of others must be the subject of a special
cautionary warning to the jury. Typical of the common law, however, the
rules of corroboration might serve their purpose of protecting the innocent
in a round-about-way. The rules respecting corroboration have become so
technical that it is a disingenious appellate court judge who cannot find an
error in the trial judge's charge to the jury with respect to corroboration.
From a reading of the cases reported this year, one is left with the distinct
feeling that a Court of Appeal is likely to order a new trial because of a mis-
direction relating to corroboration where they feel some sympathy towards
the accused, or where his conviction appears to be against the weight of the
evidence. Although this subterfuge perhaps achieves the purpose of the
rules, it does so at the expense of candor and frankness in the judicial deci-
sion-making process.
A. Witnesses That Need To Be Corroborated
1. Accomplices
Under common law, a jury must be instructed that it is dangerous to
convict an accused on the evidence of an accomplice in the absence of cor-
roboration. A perennial issue is-who is an accomplice? It was held in
1974 that an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice; ' a person who
might have been charged with another crime arising out of the incident, but
not with the crime the accused was charged with, is not an accomplice; 1"
and, a purchaser of narcotics while he might be guilty of possession is not
an accomplice to an accused who is charged with trafficking in a narcotic.
Although the last two cases contain a fairly lengthy discussion of who is an
accomplice, the only interesting aspect of all three decisions is that in prin-
105 Mejelle, art. 1685, cited in Livneh, The Law of Evidence (Amendment) Law,
1968, 5 IsRAEL. L. REv. 268 (1970).
1" Regina v. Williams, 1 Ont.2d 474 (1973).
185 Regina v. Quiring, [1974] 6 W.W.R. 13, 27 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 367 (Sask.).
166 Regina v. Perry, 6 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 133, 18 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 366 (P.E.I.
1974).
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ciple they are probably all wrongly decided. An accomplice's evidence is
likely to be unreliable because as a result of testifying against the accused
he might expect some favour or leniency from the prosecution with respect
to his own involvement in the crime. Therefore, in the law of corroboration,
the concept of an accomplice should be construed to include any person who
might succumb to this temptation for lying. The material witnesses in all
three of the cases reported in 1974 had this motive for lying, and yet in
defining an accomplice the judges never once adverted to the reasons for the
rule. 167
2. Unsavory Witnesses
While it is difficult to find holdings on this point, there is often a sugges-
tion in the cases that even though technically the witness's evidence does not
require corroboration, if a witness is of unsavoury character, closely connect-
ed with the crime, or has a strong motive to lie, there is an obligation on the
trial judge to direct the jury to view their evidence with caution. Such
a suggestion was made in at least one case this year.
B. Function of Judge and Jury
Whether there is evidence in a case which amounts to corroboration
is for the jury to decide. The judge however, as part of his general
responsibility to ensure the jury acts reasonably, must make a preliminary
determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
corroboration. He must also inform them of all the evidence that is capable
of amounting to corroboration; his failure to do so is a misdirection. "' If
there is more than one accused person, he must specify the guilt of which
accused the evidence might corroborate. "' Also if the law deems it danger-
ous to convict on the basis of the testimony of a particular witness, in the
absence of corroboration, it is a misdirection if the judge tells the jury that
they must convict if they believe the witness's evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1'
C. Definition of Corroboration
What is the nature of corroborative evidence? Wigmore describes
precedents on this question as "mere useless chaff". " The cases reported
this year add to the stack. In determining whether evidence might be cor-
roborative, most judges begin by quoting or paraphrasing The King v. Bas-
167In Horsburgh v. The Queen, [1957] Sup. Ct. 746, 2 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 228, 63
D.LR.2d 699, the Supreme Court of Canada sanctioned a purposive approach to the
definition of an accomplice.
'2
6 Regina v. Nalon, 14 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 49 (Ont. 1973).
170 Regina v. Lieberman, 17 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 536 (Ont. 1974).
171 Id.
172 VII WIoMoRE § 2059. at 334.
Evidence
Ottawa Law Review
kerville. For instance, in Regina v. Quiring, Chief Justice Culliton stated:
"Evidence ... to be corroborative, must be independent evidence and must
implicate the accused." ", The definition is usefully broken down into its
two aspects. First, the evidence must be independent of the witness it is
corroborating. Secondly, it must implicate the accused by proving the of-
fence or the identity of the accused. While both the offence and identity,
if disputed, must be corroborated at the end of the case to implicate the ac-
cused, one piece of evidence to be corroborative does not have to corroborate
both facts. "
Since the need for corroboration is assumed to arise because of the un-
reliability of a particular witness's testimony, logically, corroborative evidence
must be evidence that the witness could not easily, or is not likely to, fabri-
cate. Posing the latter part of this statement as a question is a useful way
of analysing whether evidence is independent of a witness's testimony. Thus,
for instance, a bloody kleenex that the victim alleged the accused cleaned
his nose with after she had struck him is not corroborative "' since it is
only significant if her testimony is believed. It would be easy for her to
manufacture such a story to explain the bloody kleenex. If there were no
other plausible explanations for the bloody kleenex, then such evidence
might have been corroborative since it would be relevant independent of her
testimony. This requirement that the evidence be independent explains
why a recent complaint by itself is not accepted as corroboration. "'
The evidence to be corroborative must also implicate the accused by
tending to prove the offence or identity. It is unclear how probative the
evidence implicating the accused must be before it can be corroborative.
The courts require judges to instruct the jury that to be corroborative the
evidence must be more consistent with the truth of the evidence of the wit-
ness whose testimony is in need of corroboration, than with its falsity. 17
So strictly is this requirement enforced that it is insufficient and a misdirection
to instruct the jury "that evidence should be consistent with the truth of the
accomplice's story on matters that are in issue", . or "[c]orroboration is
evidence that supports, in this case, her evidence and implicates the accused
in the commission of the crime". "' Although the verbal formula required
could be interpreted as simply restating the standard of relevancy, obviously
the judges assume they are stating a higher degree of probative value than
17 [1916] 2 K.B. 658, 12 Cr. App. R. 81, [1916-17] All F.R. Rep. 38 (C.C.A.
1916).
174 Supra note 165, at 33-34, 27 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 367, at 389.
"5 Regina v. Goforth, [1974] 6 W.W.R. 119, 19 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 88 (Sask.
1974).
176 Regina v. White, 16 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 162, 27 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 66 (Ont.
1974).
17 Regina v. Pelletier, 12 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 5, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 90 (Sask.
1973).
178Regina v. Lieberman, supra note 170.
179 Regina v. Nalon, supra note 168, at 55.
10 Regina v. White, supra note 176, at 167, 27 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 70.
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the one required to simply render evidence relevant. Independent evidence,
even though relevant, has been held not to be corroborative. In Regina v.
Fisico, "' on a charge of arson the Crown led evidence that the victim of the
alleged arson had refused to buy more stolen merchandise from the accused.
This evidence while relevant in that it revealed a motive for the crime-as
being an act of vengeance-was held not to be sufficiently probative to
amount to corroboration.
During the year, the following evidence was held to be or stated as
being capable of being corroboration: on the issue of consent to intercourse,
the physical and emotional condition of the victim following the alleged
rape; 1' however, in one case the court said that if such evidence was ac-
cepted as corroboration the trial judge must "caution the jury in language
appropriate to the case of the frailties inherent in a condition of distress
arising from the fact that it may be feigned [may not be independent] or
may have causes other than the alleged rape or indecent assault"; ' on the
issue of consent to intercourse, bruises and other physical injuries and torn
clothing; " on the issue of consent, the victim's screams heard by a wit-
ness; 1" on the issue of consent, the fact that the victim was let out of the
accused's truck some distance from home; false and inconsistent state-
ments made by the accused to the police; ." the fact that a knife that the
victim alleged was used to threaten her was found in the accused's posses-
sion;' on the issue of whether the accused had intercourse with a female
under fourteen, similar acts and evidence of opportunity combined with the
most suspicious circumstances; "  evidence that the accused attempted
suicide after being questioned about the crime. "
D. Mutual Corroboration
An issue that frequently arises, and on which there are conflicting case
181 Regina v. Fisico, 15 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 20, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 207 (Oat.
1973).
1, Regina v. Lindsay, 24 Can. Crim. (as.) 105 (Ont. 1970) (upon arriving
home, the victim's eyes were starry, her face dead white, she had blood on her fore-
head, and her face was streaked with dirt as if she had been crying); Regina v. White,
supra note 176 (the victim was seen running out of a park in a hysterical and dis-
heveled condition, her hair matted and full of pine needles, screaming for assistance
with her alleged assaulters in pursuit); Regina v. Bear, 13 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 570, 24
Can. Crim. (n.s.) 393 (Sask. 1973) (victim in emotional and hysterical condition when
interviewed by police officers, evidence of physical bruises and injuries).
183 Regina v. Boyd, 17 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 6, at II, 25 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 381, at
386 (Ont. 1974).
'" Regina v. Goforth, supra note 175; Regina v. Bell, supra note 106; Regina v.
Tweedale, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) 100 (Ont. 1973); R. v. Lindsay, supra note 182.
'"
5 R. v. Lindsay, supra note 182 (a witness heard screams coming from the
place where the victim said she was forced into a truck).
I" Id.
187 d.; Regina v. White, supra note 176.
188 Regina v. Goforth, supra note 175.
18 Regina v. Wlliams, supra note 164 (evidence that under suspicious circum-
stances the accused and victim were found in a bedroom with the door locked).
290 Id.
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authorities on almost all aspects, 1" is whether a witness whose evidence
must be corroborated can corroborate the evidence of another such witness.
This year, the cases held that the wife of an accomplice is capable of cor-
roborating his evidence; " the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence may
be corroborated by another such victim; ,0 and that an accomplice can cor-
roborate the evidence of a rape victim. 19 The courts appear to be grad-
ually liberalizing the rules of mutual corroboration. But they are moving
cautiously, and in one case, while it was held that victims of a gang rape
might corroborate one another, the court stated that the trial judge in such a
case "should nevertheless warn the jury that the evidence of the complaints
should be approached with caution because of the danger of their collabora-
ting to fabricate their complaints". 19
E. Corroboration in Civil Cases
The standard for corroboration in civil cases is much lower than the
standard in criminal cases; the evidence merely has to support the case in
some material way. 19 The provision most fruitious of litigation concerning
corroboration in civil cases, is the requirement in virtually all provinces, de-
signed to discourage dishonest or ill-founded claims against estates, that a
party in an action against the personal representative of a deceased person
cannot obtain judgment unless his evidence on any matter occuring before
the death of the deceased person is corroborated. The Prince Edward
Island Supreme Court held in 1974 that the establishment by the deceased
of a joint bank account with the opposite party to the action was not capable
of corroborating that party's testimony that the money the deceased put in
the bank account was intended to be a gift to him. 197 The Nova Scotia
Supreme Court, Appeal Division, held that a devise of land by will to the
plaintiff, made shortly after an alleged oral agreement to convey the land,
amounted to corroboration of the oral agreement. 198
Most provinces also require corroboration of the testimony of the
mother of a child in affiliation proceedings. The Newfoundland Court of
Appeal held 199 that an admission by the alleged father that he had sexual
intercourse with the mother of the child during the month in which she be-
came pregnant is sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of the
mother that he is the father.
191 Sheppard, Mutual Corroboration, 15 CalM. L.Q. 62 (1972).
1'2 Regina v. Nalon, supra note 168.
193 Regina v. Fisico, supra note 181.
194 Regina v. White, supra note 176; Regina v. Stewart, 14 Can. Crim. Cas.2d 97
(Sask. 1973).
295 Regina v. Fisico, supra note 181, at 23, 24 Can. Crim. (n.s.) at 210.
19 6Johnson v. Nova Scotia Trust Co., 6 N.S.2d 88 (1973).
19' MacLeod's Estate v. BonneUI, 4 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 511, 39 D.L.R.3d 104 (P.E.I.
1973).
"8 Johnson v. Nova Scotia Trust Co., supra note 196.
119 Buckman v. Griffin, 6 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 104 (Nfld. 1974).
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